1CRYPTTAB(5)                        crypttab                        CRYPTTAB(5)
2
3
4

NAME

6       crypttab - Configuration for encrypted block devices
7

SYNOPSIS

9       /etc/crypttab
10

DESCRIPTION

12       The /etc/crypttab file describes encrypted block devices that are set
13       up during system boot.
14
15       Empty lines and lines starting with the "#" character are ignored. Each
16       of the remaining lines describes one encrypted block device. Fields are
17       delimited by white space.
18
19       Each line is in the form
20
21           volume-name encrypted-device key-file options
22
23       The first two fields are mandatory, the remaining two are optional.
24
25       Setting up encrypted block devices using this file supports four
26       encryption modes: LUKS, TrueCrypt, BitLocker and plain. See
27       cryptsetup(8) for more information about each mode. When no mode is
28       specified in the options field and the block device contains a LUKS
29       signature, it is opened as a LUKS device; otherwise, it is assumed to
30       be in raw dm-crypt (plain mode) format.
31
32       The four fields of /etc/crypttab are defined as follows:
33
34        1. The first field contains the name of the resulting volume with
35           decrypted data; its block device is set up below /dev/mapper/.
36
37        2. The second field contains a path to the underlying block device or
38           file, or a specification of a block device via "UUID=" followed by
39           the UUID.
40
41        3. The third field specifies an absolute path to a file with the
42           encryption key. Optionally, the path may be followed by ":" and an
43           /etc/fstab style device specification (e.g. starting with "LABEL="
44           or similar); in which case the path is taken relative to the
45           specified device's file system root. If the field is not present or
46           is "none" or "-", a key file named after the volume to unlock (i.e.
47           the first column of the line), suffixed with .key is automatically
48           loaded from the /etc/cryptsetup-keys.d/ and /run/cryptsetup-keys.d/
49           directories, if present. Otherwise, the password has to be manually
50           entered during system boot. For swap encryption, /dev/urandom may
51           be used as key file, resulting in a randomized key.
52
53           If the specified key file path refers to an AF_UNIX stream socket
54           in the file system, the key is acquired by connecting to the socket
55           and reading it from the connection. This allows the implementation
56           of a service to provide key information dynamically, at the moment
57           when it is needed. For details see below.
58
59        4. The fourth field, if present, is a comma-delimited list of options.
60           The supported options are listed below.
61

KEY ACQUISITION

63       Six different mechanisms for acquiring the decryption key or passphrase
64       unlocking the encrypted volume are supported. Specifically:
65
66        1. Most prominently, the user may be queried interactively during
67           volume activation (i.e. typically at boot), asking them to type in
68           the necessary passphrases.
69
70        2. The (unencrypted) key may be read from a file on disk, possibly on
71           removable media. The third field of each line encodes the location,
72           for details see above.
73
74        3. The (unencrypted) key may be requested from another service, by
75           specifying an AF_UNIX file system socket in place of a key file in
76           the third field. For details see above and below.
77
78        4. The key may be acquired via a PKCS#11 compatible hardware security
79           token or smartcard. In this case an encrypted key is stored on
80           disk/removable media, acquired via AF_UNIX, or stored in the LUKS2
81           JSON token metadata header. The encrypted key is then decrypted by
82           the PKCS#11 token with an RSA key stored on it, and then used to
83           unlock the encrypted volume. Use the pkcs11-uri= option described
84           below to use this mechanism.
85
86        5. Similarly, the key may be acquired via a FIDO2 compatible hardware
87           security token (which must implement the "hmac-secret" extension).
88           In this case a key generated randomly during enrollment is stored
89           on disk/removable media, acquired via AF_UNIX, or stored in the
90           LUKS2 JSON token metadata header. The random key is hashed via a
91           keyed hash function (HMAC) on the FIDO2 token, using a secret key
92           stored on the token that never leaves it. The resulting hash value
93           is then used as key to unlock the encrypted volume. Use the
94           fido2-device= option described below to use this mechanism.
95
96        6. Similarly, the key may be acquired via a TPM2 security chip. In
97           this case a (during enrollment) randomly generated key — encrypted
98           by an asymmetric key derived from the TPM2 chip's seed key — is
99           stored on disk/removable media, acquired via AF_UNIX, or stored in
100           the LUKS2 JSON token metadata header. Use the tpm2-device= option
101           described below to use this mechanism.
102
103       For the latter five mechanisms the source for the key material used for
104       unlocking the volume is primarily configured in the third field of each
105       /etc/crypttab line, but may also configured in /etc/cryptsetup-keys.d/
106       and /run/cryptsetup-keys.d/ (see above) or in the LUKS2 JSON token
107       header (in case of the latter three). Use the systemd-cryptenroll(1)
108       tool to enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2 and TPM2 devices in LUKS2 volumes.
109

SUPPORTED OPTIONS

111       The following options may be used in the fourth field of each line:
112
113       cipher=
114           Specifies the cipher to use. See cryptsetup(8) for possible values
115           and the default value of this option. A cipher with unpredictable
116           IV values, such as "aes-cbc-essiv:sha256", is recommended. Embedded
117           commas in the cipher specification need to be escaped by preceding
118           them with a backslash, see example below.
119
120       discard
121           Allow discard requests to be passed through the encrypted block
122           device. This improves performance on SSD storage but has security
123           implications.
124
125       hash=
126           Specifies the hash to use for password hashing. See cryptsetup(8)
127           for possible values and the default value of this option.
128
129       header=
130           Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the header
131           containing the master key(s) is stored. This option is only
132           relevant for LUKS and TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt devices. See
133           cryptsetup(8) for possible values and the default value of this
134           option.
135
136           Optionally, the path may be followed by ":" and an /etc/fstab
137           device specification (e.g. starting with "UUID=" or similar); in
138           which case, the path is relative to the device file system root.
139           The device gets mounted automatically for LUKS device activation
140           duration only.
141
142       keyfile-offset=
143           Specifies the number of bytes to skip at the start of the key file.
144           See cryptsetup(8) for possible values and the default value of this
145           option.
146
147       keyfile-size=
148           Specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the key file.
149           See cryptsetup(8) for possible values and the default value of this
150           option. This option is ignored in plain encryption mode, as the key
151           file size is then given by the key size.
152
153       keyfile-erase
154           If enabled, the specified key file is erased after the volume is
155           activated or when activation fails. This is in particular useful
156           when the key file is only acquired transiently before activation
157           (e.g. via a file in /run/, generated by a service running before
158           activation), and shall be removed after use. Defaults to off.
159
160       key-slot=
161           Specifies the key slot to compare the passphrase or key against. If
162           the key slot does not match the given passphrase or key, but
163           another would, the setup of the device will fail regardless. This
164           option implies luks. See cryptsetup(8) for possible values. The
165           default is to try all key slots in sequential order.
166
167       keyfile-timeout=
168           Specifies the timeout for the device on which the key file resides
169           or the device used as the key file, and falls back to a password if
170           it could not be accessed. See systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8) for
171           key files on external devices.
172
173       luks
174           Force LUKS mode. When this mode is used, the following options are
175           ignored since they are provided by the LUKS header on the device:
176           cipher=, hash=, size=.
177
178       bitlk
179           Decrypt BitLocker drive. Encryption parameters are deduced by
180           cryptsetup from BitLocker header.
181
182       _netdev
183           Marks this cryptsetup device as requiring network. It will be
184           started after the network is available, similarly to
185           systemd.mount(5) units marked with _netdev. The service unit to set
186           up this device will be ordered between remote-fs-pre.target and
187           remote-cryptsetup.target, instead of cryptsetup-pre.target and
188           cryptsetup.target.
189
190           Hint: if this device is used for a mount point that is specified in
191           fstab(5), the _netdev option should also be used for the mount
192           point. Otherwise, a dependency loop might be created where the
193           mount point will be pulled in by local-fs.target, while the service
194           to configure the network is usually only started after the local
195           file system has been mounted.
196
197       noauto
198           This device will not be added to cryptsetup.target. This means that
199           it will not be automatically unlocked on boot, unless something
200           else pulls it in. In particular, if the device is used for a mount
201           point, it'll be unlocked automatically during boot, unless the
202           mount point itself is also disabled with noauto.
203
204       nofail
205           This device will not be a hard dependency of cryptsetup.target.
206           It'll still be pulled in and started, but the system will not wait
207           for the device to show up and be unlocked, and boot will not fail
208           if this is unsuccessful. Note that other units that depend on the
209           unlocked device may still fail. In particular, if the device is
210           used for a mount point, the mount point itself also needs to have
211           the nofail option, or the boot will fail if the device is not
212           unlocked successfully.
213
214       offset=
215           Start offset in the backend device, in 512-byte sectors. This
216           option is only relevant for plain devices.
217
218       plain
219           Force plain encryption mode.
220
221       read-only, readonly
222           Set up the encrypted block device in read-only mode.
223
224       same-cpu-crypt
225           Perform encryption using the same CPU that IO was submitted on. The
226           default is to use an unbound workqueue so that encryption work is
227           automatically balanced between available CPUs.
228
229           This requires kernel 4.0 or newer.
230
231       submit-from-crypt-cpus
232           Disable offloading writes to a separate thread after encryption.
233           There are some situations where offloading write requests from the
234           encryption threads to a dedicated thread degrades performance
235           significantly. The default is to offload write requests to a
236           dedicated thread because it benefits the CFQ scheduler to have
237           writes submitted using the same context.
238
239           This requires kernel 4.0 or newer.
240
241       no-read-workqueue
242           Bypass dm-crypt internal workqueue and process read requests
243           synchronously. The default is to queue these requests and process
244           them asynchronously.
245
246           This requires kernel 5.9 or newer.
247
248       no-write-workqueue
249           Bypass dm-crypt internal workqueue and process write requests
250           synchronously. The default is to queue these requests and process
251           them asynchronously.
252
253           This requires kernel 5.9 or newer.
254
255       skip=
256           How many 512-byte sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the
257           beginning. This is different from the offset= option with respect
258           to the sector numbers used in initialization vector (IV)
259           calculation. Using offset= will shift the IV calculation by the
260           same negative amount. Hence, if offset=n is given, sector n will
261           get a sector number of 0 for the IV calculation. Using skip= causes
262           sector n to also be the first sector of the mapped device, but with
263           its number for IV generation being n.
264
265           This option is only relevant for plain devices.
266
267       size=
268           Specifies the key size in bits. See cryptsetup(8) for possible
269           values and the default value of this option.
270
271       sector-size=
272           Specifies the sector size in bytes. See cryptsetup(8) for possible
273           values and the default value of this option.
274
275       swap
276           The encrypted block device will be used as a swap device, and will
277           be formatted accordingly after setting up the encrypted block
278           device, with mkswap(8). This option implies plain.
279
280           WARNING: Using the swap option will destroy the contents of the
281           named partition during every boot, so make sure the underlying
282           block device is specified correctly.
283
284       tcrypt
285           Use TrueCrypt encryption mode. When this mode is used, the
286           following options are ignored since they are provided by the
287           TrueCrypt header on the device or do not apply: cipher=, hash=,
288           keyfile-offset=, keyfile-size=, size=.
289
290           When this mode is used, the passphrase is read from the key file
291           given in the third field. Only the first line of this file is read,
292           excluding the new line character.
293
294           Note that the TrueCrypt format uses both passphrase and key files
295           to derive a password for the volume. Therefore, the passphrase and
296           all key files need to be provided. Use tcrypt-keyfile= to provide
297           the absolute path to all key files. When using an empty passphrase
298           in combination with one or more key files, use "/dev/null" as the
299           password file in the third field.
300
301       tcrypt-hidden
302           Use the hidden TrueCrypt volume. This option implies tcrypt.
303
304           This will map the hidden volume that is inside of the volume
305           provided in the second field. Please note that there is no
306           protection for the hidden volume if the outer volume is mounted
307           instead. See cryptsetup(8) for more information on this limitation.
308
309       tcrypt-keyfile=
310           Specifies the absolute path to a key file to use for a TrueCrypt
311           volume. This implies tcrypt and can be used more than once to
312           provide several key files.
313
314           See the entry for tcrypt on the behavior of the passphrase and key
315           files when using TrueCrypt encryption mode.
316
317       tcrypt-system
318           Use TrueCrypt in system encryption mode. This option implies
319           tcrypt.
320
321       tcrypt-veracrypt
322           Check for a VeraCrypt volume. VeraCrypt is a fork of TrueCrypt that
323           is mostly compatible, but uses different, stronger key derivation
324           algorithms that cannot be detected without this flag. Enabling this
325           option could substantially slow down unlocking, because VeraCrypt's
326           key derivation takes much longer than TrueCrypt's. This option
327           implies tcrypt.
328
329       veracrypt-pim=
330           Specifies a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier (PIM) value, which
331           can range from 0..2147468 for standard veracrypt volumes and
332           0..65535 for veracrypt system volumes. A value of 0 will imply the
333           VeraCrypt default. This option is only effective when
334           tcrypt-veracrypt is set.
335
336           Note that VeraCrypt enforces a minimal allowed PIM value depending
337           on the password strength and the hash algorithm used for key
338           derivation, however veracrypt-pim= is not checked against these
339           bounds.  See documentation[1] for more information.
340
341       timeout=
342           Specifies the timeout for querying for a password. If no unit is
343           specified, seconds is used. Supported units are s, ms, us, min, h,
344           d. A timeout of 0 waits indefinitely (which is the default).
345
346       tmp=
347           The encrypted block device will be prepared for using it as /tmp/;
348           it will be formatted using mkfs(8). Takes a file system type as
349           argument, such as "ext4", "xfs" or "btrfs". If no argument is
350           specified defaults to "ext4". This option implies plain.
351
352           WARNING: Using the tmp option will destroy the contents of the
353           named partition during every boot, so make sure the underlying
354           block device is specified correctly.
355
356       tries=
357           Specifies the maximum number of times the user is queried for a
358           password. The default is 3. If set to 0, the user is queried for a
359           password indefinitely.
360
361       headless=
362           Takes a boolean argument, defaults to false. If true, never query
363           interactively for the password/PIN. Useful for headless systems.
364
365       verify
366           If the encryption password is read from console, it has to be
367           entered twice to prevent typos.
368
369       password-echo=yes|no|masked
370           Controls whether to echo passwords or security token PINs that are
371           read from console. Takes a boolean or the special string "masked".
372           The default is password-echo=masked.
373
374           If enabled, the typed characters are echoed literally. If disabled,
375           the typed characters are not echoed in any form, the user will not
376           get feedback on their input. If set to "masked", an asterisk ("*")
377           is echoed for each character typed. Regardless of which mode is
378           chosen, if the user hits the tabulator key ("↹") at any time, or
379           the backspace key ("⌫") before any other data has been entered,
380           then echo is turned off.
381
382       pkcs11-uri=
383           Takes either the special value "auto" or an RFC7512 PKCS#11 URI[2]
384           pointing to a private RSA key which is used to decrypt the
385           encrypted key specified in the third column of the line. This is
386           useful for unlocking encrypted volumes through PKCS#11 compatible
387           security tokens or smartcards. See below for an example how to set
388           up this mechanism for unlocking a LUKS2 volume with a YubiKey
389           security token.
390
391           If specified as "auto" the volume must be of type LUKS2 and must
392           carry PKCS#11 security token metadata in its LUKS2 JSON token
393           section. In this mode the URI and the encrypted key are
394           automatically read from the LUKS2 JSON token header. Use systemd-
395           cryptenroll(1) as simple tool for enrolling PKCS#11 security tokens
396           or smartcards in a way compatible with "auto". In this mode the
397           third column of the line should remain empty (that is, specified as
398           "-").
399
400           The specified URI can refer directly to a private RSA key stored on
401           a token or alternatively just to a slot or token, in which case a
402           search for a suitable private RSA key will be performed. In this
403           case if multiple suitable objects are found the token is refused.
404           The encrypted key configured in the third column of the line is
405           passed as is (i.e. in binary form, unprocessed) to RSA decryption.
406           The resulting decrypted key is then Base64 encoded before it is
407           used to unlock the LUKS volume.
408
409           Use systemd-cryptenroll --pkcs11-token-uri=list to list all
410           suitable PKCS#11 security tokens currently plugged in, along with
411           their URIs.
412
413           Note that many newer security tokens that may be used as PKCS#11
414           security token typically also implement the newer and simpler FIDO2
415           standard. Consider using fido2-device= (described below) to enroll
416           it via FIDO2 instead. Note that a security token enrolled via
417           PKCS#11 cannot be used to unlock the volume via FIDO2, unless also
418           enrolled via FIDO2, and vice versa.
419
420       fido2-device=
421           Takes either the special value "auto" or the path to a "hidraw"
422           device node (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1) referring to a FIDO2 security
423           token that implements the "hmac-secret" extension (most current
424           hardware security tokens do). See below for an example how to set
425           up this mechanism for unlocking an encrypted volume with a FIDO2
426           security token.
427
428           If specified as "auto" the FIDO2 token device is automatically
429           discovered, as it is plugged in.
430
431           FIDO2 volume unlocking requires a client ID hash (CID) to be
432           configured via fido2-cid= (see below) and a key to pass to the
433           security token's HMAC functionality (configured in the line's third
434           column) to operate. If not configured and the volume is of type
435           LUKS2, the CID and the key are read from LUKS2 JSON token metadata
436           instead. Use systemd-cryptenroll(1) as simple tool for enrolling
437           FIDO2 security tokens, compatible with this automatic mode, which
438           is only available for LUKS2 volumes.
439
440           Use systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=list to list all suitable
441           FIDO2 security tokens currently plugged in, along with their device
442           nodes.
443
444           This option implements the following mechanism: the configured key
445           is hashed via they HMAC keyed hash function the FIDO2 device
446           implements, keyed by a secret key embedded on the device. The
447           resulting hash value is Base64 encoded and used to unlock the LUKS2
448           volume. As it should not be possible to extract the secret from the
449           hardware token, it should not be possible to retrieve the hashed
450           key given the configured key — without possessing the hardware
451           token.
452
453           Note that many security tokens that implement FIDO2 also implement
454           PKCS#11, suitable for unlocking volumes via the pkcs11-uri= option
455           described above. Typically the newer, simpler FIDO2 standard is
456           preferable.
457
458       fido2-cid=
459           Takes a Base64 encoded FIDO2 client ID to use for the FIDO2 unlock
460           operation. If specified, but fido2-device= is not,
461           fido2-device=auto is implied. If fido2-device= is used but
462           fido2-cid= is not, the volume must be of LUKS2 type, and the CID is
463           read from the LUKS2 JSON token header. Use systemd-cryptenroll(1)
464           for enrolling a FIDO2 token in the LUKS2 header compatible with
465           this automatic mode.
466
467       fido2-rp=
468           Takes a string, configuring the FIDO2 Relying Party (rp) for the
469           FIDO2 unlock operation. If not specified "io.systemd.cryptsetup" is
470           used, except if the LUKS2 JSON token header contains a different
471           value. It should normally not be necessary to override this.
472
473       tpm2-device=
474           Takes either the special value "auto" or the path to a device node
475           (e.g.  /dev/tpmrm0) referring to a TPM2 security chip. See below
476           for an example how to set up this mechanism for unlocking an
477           encrypted volume with a TPM2 chip.
478
479           Use tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure the set of TPM2 PCRs to
480           bind the volume unlocking to. Use systemd-cryptenroll(1) as simple
481           tool for enrolling TPM2 security chips in LUKS2 volumes.
482
483           If specified as "auto" the TPM2 device is automatically discovered.
484           Use systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=list to list all suitable
485           TPM2 devices currently available, along with their device nodes.
486
487           This option implements the following mechanism: when enrolling a
488           TPM2 device via systemd-cryptenroll on a LUKS2 volume, a randomized
489           key unlocking the volume is generated on the host and loaded into
490           the TPM2 chip where it is encrypted with an asymmetric "primary"
491           key pair derived from the TPM2's internal "seed" key. Neither the
492           seed key nor the primary key are permitted to ever leave the TPM2
493           chip — however, the now encrypted randomized key may. It is saved
494           in the LUKS2 volume JSON token header. When unlocking the encrypted
495           volume, the primary key pair is generated on the TPM2 chip again
496           (which works as long as the chip's seed key is correctly maintained
497           by the TPM2 chip), which is then used to decrypt (on the TPM2 chip)
498           the encrypted key from the LUKS2 volume JSON token header saved
499           there during enrollment. The resulting decrypted key is then used
500           to unlock the volume. When the randomized key is encrypted the
501           current values of the selected PCRs (see below) are included in the
502           operation, so that different PCR state results in different
503           encrypted keys and the decrypted key can only be recovered if the
504           same PCR state is reproduced.
505
506       tpm2-pcrs=
507           Takes a "+" separated list of numeric TPM2 PCR (i.e. "Platform
508           Configuration Register") indexes to bind the TPM2 volume unlocking
509           to. This option is only useful when TPM2 enrollment metadata is not
510           available in the LUKS2 JSON token header already, the way
511           systemd-cryptenroll writes it there. If not used (and no metadata
512           in the LUKS2 JSON token header defines it), defaults to a list of a
513           single entry: PCR 7. Assign an empty string to encode a policy that
514           binds the key to no PCRs, making the key accessible to local
515           programs regardless of the current PCR state.
516
517       tpm2-pin=
518           Takes a boolean argument, defaults to "false". Controls whether
519           TPM2 volume unlocking is bound to a PIN in addition to PCRs.
520           Similarly, this option is only useful when TPM2 enrollment metadata
521           is not available.
522
523       tpm2-signature=
524           Takes an absolute path to a TPM2 PCR JSON signature file, as
525           produced by the systemd-measure(1) tool. This permits locking LUKS2
526           volumes to any PCR values for which a valid signature matching a
527           public key specified at key enrollment time can be provided. See
528           systemd-cryptenroll(1) for details on enrolling TPM2 PCR public
529           keys. If this option is not specified but it is attempted to unlock
530           a LUKS2 volume with a signed TPM2 PCR enrollment a suitable
531           signature file tpm2-pcr-signature.json is searched for in
532           /etc/systemd/, /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/ (in this order).
533
534       tpm2-measure-pcr=
535           Controls whether to measure the volume key of the encrypted volume
536           to a TPM2 PCR. If set to "no" (which is the default) no PCR
537           extension is done. If set to "yes" the volume key is measured into
538           PCR 15. If set to a decimal integer in the range 0...23 the volume
539           key is measured into the specified PCR. The volume key is measured
540           along with the activated volume name and its UUID. This
541           functionality is particularly useful for the encrypted volume
542           backing the root file system, as it then allows later TPM objects
543           to be securely bound to the root file system and hence the specific
544           installation.
545
546       tpm2-measure-bank=
547           Selects one or more TPM2 PCR banks to measure the volume key into,
548           as configured with tpm2-measure-pcr= above. Multiple banks may be
549           specified, separated by a colon character. If not specified
550           automatically determines available and used banks. Expects a
551           message digest name (e.g.  "sha1", "sha256", ...) as argument, to
552           identify the bank.
553
554       token-timeout=
555           Specifies how long to wait at most for configured security devices
556           (i.e. FIDO2, PKCS#11, TPM2) to show up. Takes a time value in
557           seconds (but other time units may be specified too, see
558           systemd.time(7) for supported formats). Defaults to 30s. Once the
559           specified timeout elapsed authentication via password is attempted.
560           Note that this timeout applies to waiting for the security device
561           to show up — it does not apply to the PIN prompt for the device
562           (should one be needed) or similar. Pass 0 to turn off the time-out
563           and wait forever.
564
565       try-empty-password=
566           Takes a boolean argument. If enabled, right before asking the user
567           for a password it is first attempted to unlock the volume with an
568           empty password. This is useful for systems that are initialized
569           with an encrypted volume with only an empty password set, which
570           shall be replaced with a suitable password during first boot, but
571           after activation.
572
573       x-systemd.device-timeout=
574           Specifies how long systemd should wait for a block device to show
575           up before giving up on the entry. The argument is a time in seconds
576           or explicitly specified units of "s", "min", "h", "ms".
577
578       x-initrd.attach
579           Setup this encrypted block device in the initrd, similarly to
580           systemd.mount(5) units marked with x-initrd.mount.
581
582           Although it's not necessary to mark the mount entry for the root
583           file system with x-initrd.mount, x-initrd.attach is still
584           recommended with the encrypted block device containing the root
585           file system as otherwise systemd will attempt to detach the device
586           during the regular system shutdown while it's still in use. With
587           this option the device will still be detached but later after the
588           root file system is unmounted.
589
590           All other encrypted block devices that contain file systems mounted
591           in the initrd should use this option.
592
593       At early boot and when the system manager configuration is reloaded,
594       this file is translated into native systemd units by systemd-
595       cryptsetup-generator(8).
596

AF_UNIX KEY FILES

598       If the key file path (as specified in the third column of /etc/crypttab
599       entries, see above) refers to an AF_UNIX stream socket in the file
600       system, the key is acquired by connecting to the socket and reading the
601       key from the connection. The connection is made from an AF_UNIX socket
602       name in the abstract namespace, see unix(7) for details. The source
603       socket name is chosen according the following format:
604
605           NUL RANDOM /cryptsetup/ VOLUME
606
607       In other words: a NUL byte (as required for abstract namespace
608       sockets), followed by a random string (consisting of alphanumeric
609       characters only), followed by the literal string "/cryptsetup/",
610       followed by the name of the volume to acquire they key for. For
611       example, for the volume "myvol":
612
613           \0d7067f78d9827418/cryptsetup/myvol
614
615       Services listening on the AF_UNIX stream socket may query the source
616       socket name with getpeername(2), and use this to determine which key to
617       send, allowing a single listening socket to serve keys for multiple
618       volumes. If the PKCS#11 logic is used (see above), the socket source
619       name is picked in similar fashion, except that the literal string
620       "/cryptsetup-pkcs11/" is used. And similarly for FIDO2
621       ("/cryptsetup-fido2/") and TPM2 ("/cryptsetup-tpm2/"). A different path
622       component is used so that services providing key material know that the
623       secret key was not requested directly, but instead an encrypted key
624       that will be decrypted via the PKCS#11/FIDO2/TPM2 logic to acquire the
625       final secret key.
626

EXAMPLES

628       Example 1. /etc/crypttab example
629
630       Set up four encrypted block devices. One using LUKS for normal storage,
631       another one for usage as a swap device and two TrueCrypt volumes. For
632       the fourth device, the option string is interpreted as two options
633       "cipher=xchacha12,aes-adiantum-plain64", "keyfile-timeout=10s".
634
635           luks       UUID=2505567a-9e27-4efe-a4d5-15ad146c258b
636           swap       /dev/sda7       /dev/urandom       swap
637           truecrypt  /dev/sda2       /etc/container_password  tcrypt
638           hidden     /mnt/tc_hidden  /dev/null    tcrypt-hidden,tcrypt-keyfile=/etc/keyfile
639           external   /dev/sda3       keyfile:LABEL=keydev keyfile-timeout=10s,cipher=xchacha12\,aes-adiantum-plain64
640
641       Example 2. Yubikey-based PKCS#11 Volume Unlocking Example
642
643       The PKCS#11 logic allows hooking up any compatible security token that
644       is capable of storing RSA decryption keys for unlocking an encrypted
645       volume. Here's an example how to set up a Yubikey security token for
646       this purpose on a LUKS2 volume, using ykmap(1) from the yubikey-manager
647       project to initialize the token and systemd-cryptenroll(1) to add it in
648       the LUKS2 volume:
649
650           # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
651
652           # Destroy any old key on the Yubikey (careful!)
653           ykman piv reset
654
655           # Generate a new private/public key pair on the device, store the public key in
656           # 'pubkey.pem'.
657           ykman piv generate-key -a RSA2048 9d pubkey.pem
658
659           # Create a self-signed certificate from this public key, and store it on the
660           # device. The "subject" should be an arbitrary user-chosen string to identify
661           # the token with.
662           ykman piv generate-certificate --subject "Knobelei" 9d pubkey.pem
663
664           # We don't need the public key anymore, let's remove it. Since it is not
665           # security sensitive we just do a regular "rm" here.
666           rm pubkey.pem
667
668           # Enroll the freshly initialized security token in the LUKS2 volume. Replace
669           # /dev/sdXn by the partition to use (e.g. /dev/sda1).
670           sudo systemd-cryptenroll --pkcs11-token-uri=auto /dev/sdXn
671
672           # Test: Let's run systemd-cryptsetup to test if this all worked.
673           sudo /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup attach mytest /dev/sdXn - pkcs11-uri=auto
674
675           # If that worked, let's now add the same line persistently to /etc/crypttab,
676           # for the future.
677           sudo bash -c 'echo "mytest /dev/sdXn - pkcs11-uri=auto" >>/etc/crypttab'
678
679       A few notes on the above:
680
681       •   We use RSA2048, which is the longest key size current Yubikeys
682           support
683
684       •   We use Yubikey key slot 9d, since that's apparently the keyslot to
685           use for decryption purposes, see documentation[3].
686
687       Example 3. FIDO2 Volume Unlocking Example
688
689       The FIDO2 logic allows using any compatible FIDO2 security token that
690       implements the "hmac-secret" extension for unlocking an encrypted
691       volume. Here's an example how to set up a FIDO2 security token for this
692       purpose for a LUKS2 volume, using systemd-cryptenroll(1):
693
694           # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
695
696           # Enroll the security token in the LUKS2 volume. Replace /dev/sdXn by the
697           # partition to use (e.g. /dev/sda1).
698           sudo systemd-cryptenroll --fido2-device=auto /dev/sdXn
699
700           # Test: Let's run systemd-cryptsetup to test if this worked.
701           sudo /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup attach mytest /dev/sdXn - fido2-device=auto
702
703           # If that worked, let's now add the same line persistently to /etc/crypttab,
704           # for the future.
705           sudo bash -c 'echo "mytest /dev/sdXn - fido2-device=auto" >>/etc/crypttab'
706
707       Example 4. TPM2 Volume Unlocking Example
708
709       The TPM2 logic allows using any TPM2 chip supported by the Linux kernel
710       for unlocking an encrypted volume. Here's an example how to set up a
711       TPM2 chip for this purpose for a LUKS2 volume, using systemd-
712       cryptenroll(1):
713
714           # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
715
716           # Enroll the TPM2 security chip in the LUKS2 volume, and bind it to PCR 7
717           # only. Replace /dev/sdXn by the partition to use (e.g. /dev/sda1).
718           sudo systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=7 /dev/sdXn
719
720           # Test: Let's run systemd-cryptsetup to test if this worked.
721           sudo /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup attach mytest /dev/sdXn - tpm2-device=auto
722
723           # If that worked, let's now add the same line persistently to /etc/crypttab,
724           # for the future.
725           sudo bash -c 'echo "mytest /dev/sdXn - tpm2-device=auto" >>/etc/crypttab'
726

SEE ALSO

728       systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8), systemd-cryptsetup-
729       generator(8), systemd-cryptenroll(1), fstab(5), cryptsetup(8),
730       mkswap(8), mke2fs(8)
731

NOTES

733        1. See documentation
734           https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Personal%20Iterations%20Multiplier%20%28PIM%29.html
735
736        2. RFC7512 PKCS#11 URI
737           https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7512
738
739        3. see documentation
740           https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Introduction/Certificate_slots.html
741
742
743
744systemd 254                                                        CRYPTTAB(5)
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