1String::Compare::ConstaUnsteTrimCeo(n3t)ributed Perl DocSutmreinntga:t:iCoonmpare::ConstantTime(3)
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6 String::Compare::ConstantTime - Timing side-channel protected string
7 compare
8
10 use String::Compare::ConstantTime;
11 if (String::Compare::ConstantTime::equals($secret_data, $user_supplied_data)) {
13 ## The strings are eq
14 }
15 An example with HMACs:
17 use String::Compare::ConstantTime;
19 use Digest::HMAC_SHA1; ## or whatever
20 my $hmac_ctx = Digest::HMAC_SHA1->new($key);
22 $hmac_ctx->add($data);
23 my $digest = $hmac_ctx->digest;
24 if (String::Compare::ConstantTime::equals($digest, $candidate_digest)) {
26 ## The candidate digest is valid
27 }
28
30 This module provides one function, "equals" (not exported by default).
31 You should pass this function two strings of the same length. Just like
33 perl's "eq", it will return true if they are string-wise identical and
34 false otherwise. However, comparing any two differing strings of the
35 same length will take a fixed amount of time. If the lengths of the
36 strings are different, "equals" will return false right away.
37
39 Some programs take different amounts of time to run depending on the
40 input values provided to them. Untrusted parties can sometimes learn
41 information you might not want them to know by measuring this time.
42 This is called a "timing side-channel".
43 Most routines that compare strings (like perl's "eq" and "cmp" and C's
45 "strcmp" and "memcmp") start scanning from the start of the strings and
46 terminate as soon as they determine the strings won't match. This is
47 good for efficiency but bad because it opens a timing side-channel. If
48 one of the strings being compared is a secret and the other is
49 controlled by some untrusted party, it is sometimes possible for this
50 untrusted party to learn the secret using a timing side-channel.
51 If the lengths of the strings are different, because "equals" returns
53 false right away the size of the secret string may be leaked (but not
54 its contents).
55
57 HMACs are "Message Authentication Codes" built on top of cryptographic
58 hashes. The HMAC algorithm produces digests that are included along
59 with a message in order to verify that whoever created the message
60 knows a particular secret password, and that this message hasn't been
61 tampered with since.
62 To verify a candidate digest included with a message, you re-compute
64 the digest using the message and the secret password. If this computed
65 digest is is the same as the candidate digest then the message is
66 considered authenticated.
67 A common side-channel attack against services that verify unlimited
69 numbers of messages automatically is to create a forged message and
70 then just send some random junk as the candidate digest. Continue
71 sending this message and junk digests that vary by the first character.
72 Repeat many times. If you find a particular digest that statistically
73 takes a longer time to be rejected than the other digests, it is
74 probably because this particular digest has the first character correct
75 and the service's final string comparison is running slightly longer.
76 At this point, you keep this first character fixed and start varying
78 the second character until it is solved. Repeat until all the
79 characters are solved or until the amount of remaining possibilities
80 are so small you can brute force it. At this point, your candidate
81 digest is considered valid and you have forged a message.
82 Note that this particular attack doesn't allow the attacker to recover
84 the secret input key to the HMAC but nevertheless can produce a valid
85 digest for any message given enough time because the service that
86 validates the HMAC is acting as an "oracle".
87 NOTE: Although this module protects against a common attack against
89 applications that store state in browser cookies, it is in no way an
90 endorsement of this practise.
91
93 Pin tumbler locks are susceptible to being picked in a similar way to
94 an attacker forging HMAC digests using a timing side-channel.
95 The traditional way to pick cheap pin tumbler locks is to apply torque
97 to the lock cylinder so that the pins are pressed against the cylinder.
98 However, because of slight manufacturing discrepancies one particular
99 pin will be the widest by a slight margin and will be pressed against
100 the cylinder tighter than the others (the cheaper the lock, the higher
101 the manufacturing tolerances). The attacker lifts this pin until the
102 cylinder gives a little bit, indicating that this pin has been solved
103 and the next widest pin is now the one being pressed against the
104 cylinder the tightest. This process is repeated until all the pins are
105 solved and the lock opens.
106 Just like an attacker trying to solve HMAC digests can work on one
108 character at a time, a lock pick can work on each pin in isolation. To
109 protect against this, quality locks force all pins to be fixed into
110 place before the cylinder rotation can be attempted, just as secure
111 HMAC verifiers force attackers to guess the entire digest on each
112 attempt.
113
115 The String-Compare-ConstantTime github repo
116 <https://github.com/hoytech/String-Compare-ConstantTime>
117 Authen::Passphrase has a good section on side-channel cryptanalysis
119 such as it pertains to password storage (mostly, it doesn't).
120 The famous TENEX password bug
122 <https://web.archive.org/web/20150913074712/http://www.meadhbh.org/services/passwords>
123 Example of a timing bug <http://rdist.root.org/2009/05/28/timing-
125 attack-in-google-keyczar-library/>
126 QSCAN <http://hcsw.org/nmap/QSCAN>
128 Practical limits of the timing side channel
130 <http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf>
131 NaCl: Crypto library designed to prevent side channel attacks
133 <http://nacl.cr.yp.to/>
134
136 Doug Hoyte, "<doug@hcsw.org>"
137
139 Copyright 2012-2018 Doug Hoyte.
140 Contributions from Paul Cochrane.
142 This module is licensed under the same terms as perl itself.
144perl v5.28.1 2018-04-23 String::Compare::ConstantTime(3)