1OPENAT2(2) Linux Programmer's Manual OPENAT2(2)
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6 openat2 - open and possibly create a file (extended)
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9 #include <sys/types.h>
10 #include <sys/stat.h>
11 #include <fcntl.h>
12 #include <linux/openat2.h>
13
14 long openat2(int dirfd, const char *pathname,
15 struct open_how *how, size_t size);
16
17 Note: There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES.
18
20 The openat2() system call is an extension of openat(2) and provides a
21 superset of its functionality.
22
23 The openat2() system call opens the file specified by pathname. If the
24 specified file does not exist, it may optionally (if O_CREAT is speci‐
25 fied in how.flags) be created.
26
27 As with openat(2), if pathname is a relative pathname, then it is in‐
28 terpreted relative to the directory referred to by the file descriptor
29 dirfd (or the current working directory of the calling process, if
30 dirfd is the special value AT_FDCWD). If pathname is an absolute path‐
31 name, then dirfd is ignored (unless how.resolve contains RE‐
32 SOLVE_IN_ROOT, in which case pathname is resolved relative to dirfd).
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34 Rather than taking a single flags argument, an extensible structure
35 (how) is passed to allow for future extensions. The size argument must
36 be specified as sizeof(struct open_how).
37
38 The open_how structure
39 The how argument specifies how pathname should be opened, and acts as a
40 superset of the flags and mode arguments to openat(2). This argument
41 is a pointer to a structure of the following form:
42
43 struct open_how {
44 u64 flags; /* O_* flags */
45 u64 mode; /* Mode for O_{CREAT,TMPFILE} */
46 u64 resolve; /* RESOLVE_* flags */
47 /* ... */
48 };
49
50 Any future extensions to openat2() will be implemented as new fields
51 appended to the above structure, with a zero value in a new field re‐
52 sulting in the kernel behaving as though that extension field was not
53 present. Therefore, the caller must zero-fill this structure on ini‐
54 tialization. (See the "Extensibility" section of the NOTES for more
55 detail on why this is necessary.)
56
57 The fields of the open_how structure are as follows:
58
59 flags This field specifies the file creation and file status flags to
60 use when opening the file. All of the O_* flags defined for
61 openat(2) are valid openat2() flag values.
62
63 Whereas openat(2) ignores unknown bits in its flags argument,
64 openat2() returns an error if unknown or conflicting flags are
65 specified in how.flags.
66
67 mode This field specifies the mode for the new file, with identical
68 semantics to the mode argument of openat(2).
69
70 Whereas openat(2) ignores bits other than those in the range
71 07777 in its mode argument, openat2() returns an error if
72 how.mode contains bits other than 07777. Similarly, an error is
73 returned if openat2() is called with a nonzero how.mode and
74 how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
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76 resolve
77 This is a bit-mask of flags that modify the way in which all
78 components of pathname will be resolved. (See path_resolu‐
79 tion(7) for background information.)
80
81 The primary use case for these flags is to allow trusted pro‐
82 grams to restrict how untrusted paths (or paths inside untrusted
83 directories) are resolved. The full list of resolve flags is as
84 follows:
85
86 RESOLVE_BENEATH
87 Do not permit the path resolution to succeed if any com‐
88 ponent of the resolution is not a descendant of the di‐
89 rectory indicated by dirfd. This causes absolute sym‐
90 bolic links (and absolute values of pathname) to be re‐
91 jected.
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93 Currently, this flag also disables magic-link resolution
94 (see below). However, this may change in the future.
95 Therefore, to ensure that magic links are not resolved,
96 the caller should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGI‐
97 CLINKS.
98
99 RESOLVE_IN_ROOT
100 Treat the directory referred to by dirfd as the root di‐
101 rectory while resolving pathname. Absolute symbolic
102 links are interpreted relative to dirfd. If a prefix
103 component of pathname equates to dirfd, then an immedi‐
104 ately following .. component likewise equates to dirfd
105 (just as /.. is traditionally equivalent to /). If path‐
106 name is an absolute path, it is also interpreted relative
107 to dirfd.
108
109 The effect of this flag is as though the calling process
110 had used chroot(2) to (temporarily) modify its root di‐
111 rectory (to the directory referred to by dirfd). How‐
112 ever, unlike chroot(2) (which changes the filesystem root
113 permanently for a process), RESOLVE_IN_ROOT allows a pro‐
114 gram to efficiently restrict path resolution on a per-
115 open basis.
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117 Currently, this flag also disables magic-link resolution.
118 However, this may change in the future. Therefore, to
119 ensure that magic links are not resolved, the caller
120 should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.
121
122 RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS
123 Disallow all magic-link resolution during path resolu‐
124 tion.
125
126 Magic links are symbolic link-like objects that are most
127 notably found in proc(5); examples include
128 /proc/[pid]/exe and /proc/[pid]/fd/*. (See symlink(7)
129 for more details.)
130
131 Unknowingly opening magic links can be risky for some ap‐
132 plications. Examples of such risks include the follow‐
133 ing:
134
135 • If the process opening a pathname is a controlling
136 process that currently has no controlling terminal (see
137 credentials(7)), then opening a magic link inside
138 /proc/[pid]/fd that happens to refer to a terminal
139 would cause the process to acquire a controlling termi‐
140 nal.
141
142 • In a containerized environment, a magic link inside
143 /proc may refer to an object outside the container, and
144 thus may provide a means to escape from the container.
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146 Because of such risks, an application may prefer to dis‐
147 able magic link resolution using the RESOLVE_NO_MAGI‐
148 CLINKS flag.
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150 If the trailing component (i.e., basename) of pathname is
151 a magic link, how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
152 and how.flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then
153 an O_PATH file descriptor referencing the magic link will
154 be returned.
155
156 RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS
157 Disallow resolution of symbolic links during path resolu‐
158 tion. This option implies RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.
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160 If the trailing component (i.e., basename) of pathname is
161 a symbolic link, how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_SYM‐
162 LINKS, and how.flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW,
163 then an O_PATH file descriptor referencing the symbolic
164 link will be returned.
165
166 Note that the effect of the RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS flag,
167 which affects the treatment of symbolic links in all of
168 the components of pathname, differs from the effect of
169 the O_NOFOLLOW file creation flag (in how.flags), which
170 affects the handling of symbolic links only in the final
171 component of pathname.
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173 Applications that employ the RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS flag are
174 encouraged to make its use configurable (unless it is
175 used for a specific security purpose), as symbolic links
176 are very widely used by end-users. Setting this flag in‐
177 discriminately—i.e., for purposes not specifically re‐
178 lated to security—for all uses of openat2() may result in
179 spurious errors on previously functional systems. This
180 may occur if, for example, a system pathname that is used
181 by an application is modified (e.g., in a new distribu‐
182 tion release) so that a pathname component (now) contains
183 a symbolic link.
184
185 RESOLVE_NO_XDEV
186 Disallow traversal of mount points during path resolution
187 (including all bind mounts). Consequently, pathname must
188 either be on the same mount as the directory referred to
189 by dirfd, or on the same mount as the current working di‐
190 rectory if dirfd is specified as AT_FDCWD.
191
192 Applications that employ the RESOLVE_NO_XDEV flag are en‐
193 couraged to make its use configurable (unless it is used
194 for a specific security purpose), as bind mounts are
195 widely used by end-users. Setting this flag indiscrimi‐
196 nately—i.e., for purposes not specifically related to se‐
197 curity—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious
198 errors on previously functional systems. This may occur
199 if, for example, a system pathname that is used by an ap‐
200 plication is modified (e.g., in a new distribution re‐
201 lease) so that a pathname component (now) contains a bind
202 mount.
203
204 If any bits other than those listed above are set in how.re‐
205 solve, an error is returned.
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208 On success, a new file descriptor is returned. On error, -1 is re‐
209 turned, and errno is set appropriately.
210
212 The set of errors returned by openat2() includes all of the errors re‐
213 turned by openat(2), as well as the following additional errors:
214
215 E2BIG An extension that this kernel does not support was specified in
216 how. (See the "Extensibility" section of NOTES for more detail
217 on how extensions are handled.)
218
219 EAGAIN how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH,
220 and the kernel could not ensure that a ".." component didn't es‐
221 cape (due to a race condition or potential attack). The caller
222 may choose to retry the openat2() call.
223
224 EINVAL An unknown flag or invalid value was specified in how.
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226 EINVAL mode is nonzero, but how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or
227 O_TMPFILE.
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229 EINVAL size was smaller than any known version of struct open_how.
230
231 ELOOP how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and one of the path
232 components was a symbolic link (or magic link).
233
234 ELOOP how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and one of the path
235 components was a magic link.
236
237 EXDEV how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH,
238 and an escape from the root during path resolution was detected.
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240 EXDEV how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_XDEV, and a path component
241 crosses a mount point.
242
244 openat2() first appeared in Linux 5.6.
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247 This system call is Linux-specific.
248
249 The semantics of RESOLVE_BENEATH were modeled after FreeBSD's O_BE‐
250 NEATH.
251
253 Glibc does not provide a wrapper for this system call; call it using
254 syscall(2).
255
256 Extensibility
257 In order to allow for future extensibility, openat2() requires the
258 user-space application to specify the size of the open_how structure
259 that it is passing. By providing this information, it is possible for
260 openat2() to provide both forwards- and backwards-compatibility, with
261 size acting as an implicit version number. (Because new extension
262 fields will always be appended, the structure size will always in‐
263 crease.) This extensibility design is very similar to other system
264 calls such as sched_setattr(2), perf_event_open(2), and clone3(2).
265
266 If we let usize be the size of the structure as specified by the user-
267 space application, and ksize be the size of the structure which the
268 kernel supports, then there are three cases to consider:
269
270 • If ksize equals usize, then there is no version mismatch and how can
271 be used verbatim.
272
273 • If ksize is larger than usize, then there are some extension fields
274 that the kernel supports which the user-space application is unaware
275 of. Because a zero value in any added extension field signifies a
276 no-op, the kernel treats all of the extension fields not provided by
277 the user-space application as having zero values. This provides
278 backwards-compatibility.
279
280 • If ksize is smaller than usize, then there are some extension fields
281 which the user-space application is aware of but which the kernel
282 does not support. Because any extension field must have its zero
283 values signify a no-op, the kernel can safely ignore the unsupported
284 extension fields if they are all-zero. If any unsupported extension
285 fields are nonzero, then -1 is returned and errno is set to E2BIG.
286 This provides forwards-compatibility.
287
288 Because the definition of struct open_how may change in the future
289 (with new fields being added when system headers are updated), user-
290 space applications should zero-fill struct open_how to ensure that re‐
291 compiling the program with new headers will not result in spurious er‐
292 rors at runtime. The simplest way is to use a designated initializer:
293
294 struct open_how how = { .flags = O_RDWR,
295 .resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT };
296
297 or explicitly using memset(3) or similar:
298
299 struct open_how how;
300 memset(&how, 0, sizeof(how));
301 how.flags = O_RDWR;
302 how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT;
303
304 A user-space application that wishes to determine which extensions the
305 running kernel supports can do so by conducting a binary search on size
306 with a structure which has every byte nonzero (to find the largest
307 value which doesn't produce an error of E2BIG).
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310 openat(2), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)
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313 This page is part of release 5.10 of the Linux man-pages project. A
314 description of the project, information about reporting bugs, and the
315 latest version of this page, can be found at
316 https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.
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320Linux 2020-11-01 OPENAT2(2)