1OPENSSL-VERIFICATION-OPTIONS(1ossl) OpenSSLOPENSSL-VERIFICATION-OPTIONS(1ossl)
2
6 openssl-verification-options - generic X.509 certificate verification
7 options
8
10 openssl command [ options ... ] [ parameters ... ]
11
13 There are many situations where X.509 certificates are verified within
14 the OpenSSL libraries and in various OpenSSL commands.
15 Certificate verification is implemented by X509_verify_cert(3). It is
17 a complicated process consisting of a number of steps and depending on
18 numerous options. The most important of them are detailed in the
19 following sections.
20 In a nutshell, a valid chain of certificates needs to be built up and
22 verified starting from the target certificate that is to be verified
23 and ending in a certificate that due to some policy is trusted.
24 Verification is done relative to the given purpose, which is the
25 intended use of the target certificate, such as SSL server, or by
26 default for any purpose.
27 The details of how each OpenSSL command handles errors are documented
29 on the specific command page.
30 DANE support is documented in openssl-s_client(1),
32 SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3), SSL_set1_host(3),
33 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3), and X509_check_host(3).
34 Trust Anchors
36 In general, according to RFC 4158 and RFC 5280, a trust anchor is any
37 public key and related subject distinguished name (DN) that for some
38 reason is considered trusted and thus is acceptable as the root of a
39 chain of certificates.
40 In practice, trust anchors are given in the form of certificates, where
42 their essential fields are the public key and the subject DN. In
43 addition to the requirements in RFC 5280, OpenSSL checks the validity
44 period of such certificates and makes use of some further fields. In
45 particular, the subject key identifier extension, if present, is used
46 for matching trust anchors during chain building.
47 In the most simple and common case, trust anchors are by default all
49 self-signed "root" CA certificates that are placed in the trust store,
50 which is a collection of certificates that are trusted for certain
51 uses. This is akin to what is used in the trust stores of Mozilla
52 Firefox, or Apple's and Microsoft's certificate stores, ...
53 From the OpenSSL perspective, a trust anchor is a certificate that
55 should be augmented with an explicit designation for which uses of a
56 target certificate the certificate may serve as a trust anchor. In PEM
57 encoding, this is indicated by the "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" string. Such
58 a designation provides a set of positive trust attributes explicitly
59 stating trust for the listed purposes and/or a set of negative trust
60 attributes explicitly rejecting the use for the listed purposes. The
61 purposes are encoded using the values defined for the extended key
62 usages (EKUs) that may be given in X.509 extensions of end-entity
63 certificates. See also the "Extended Key Usage" section below.
64 The currently recognized uses are clientAuth (SSL client use),
66 serverAuth (SSL server use), emailProtection (S/MIME email use),
67 codeSigning (object signer use), OCSPSigning (OCSP responder use), OCSP
68 (OCSP request use), timeStamping (TSA server use), and
69 anyExtendedKeyUsage. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the last of these blocks all
70 uses when rejected or enables all uses when trusted.
71 A certificate, which may be CA certificate or an end-entity
73 certificate, is considered a trust anchor for the given use if and only
74 if all the following conditions hold:
75 • It is an an element of the trust store.
77 • It does not have a negative trust attribute rejecting the given
79 use.
80 • It has a positive trust attribute accepting the given use or (by
82 default) one of the following compatibilty conditions apply: It is
83 self-signed or the -partial_chain option is given (which
84 corresponds to the X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN flag being set).
85 Certification Path Building
87 First, a certificate chain is built up starting from the target
88 certificate and ending in a trust anchor.
89 The chain is built up iteratively, looking up in turn a certificate
91 with suitable key usage that matches as an issuer of the current
92 "subject" certificate as described below. If there is such a
93 certificate, the first one found that is currently valid is taken,
94 otherwise the one that expired most recently of all such certificates.
95 For efficiency, no backtracking is performed, thus any further
96 candidate issuer certificates that would match equally are ignored.
97 When a self-signed certificate has been added, chain construction
99 stops. In this case it must fully match a trust anchor, otherwise
100 chain building fails.
101 A candidate issuer certificate matches a subject certificate if all of
103 the following conditions hold:
104 • Its subject name matches the issuer name of the subject
106 certificate.
107 • If the subject certificate has an authority key identifier
109 extension, each of its sub-fields equals the corresponding subject
110 key identifier, serial number, and issuer field of the candidate
111 issuer certificate, as far as the respective fields are present in
112 both certificates.
113 • The certificate signature algorithm used to sign the subject
115 certificate is supported and equals the public key algorithm of the
116 candidate issuer certificate.
117 The lookup first searches for issuer certificates in the trust store.
119 If it does not find a match there it consults the list of untrusted
120 ("intermediate" CA) certificates, if provided.
121 Certification Path Validation
123 When the certificate chain building process was successful the chain
124 components and their links are checked thoroughly.
125 The first step is to check that each certificate is well-formed. Part
127 of these checks are enabled only if the -x509_strict option is given.
128 The second step is to check the extensions of every untrusted
130 certificate for consistency with the supplied purpose. If the -purpose
131 option is not given then no such checks are done except for SSL/TLS
132 connection setup, where by default "sslserver" or "sslclient", are
133 checked. The target or "leaf" certificate, as well as any other
134 untrusted certificates, must have extensions compatible with the
135 specified purpose. All certificates except the target or "leaf" must
136 also be valid CA certificates. The precise extensions required are
137 described in more detail in "CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS" in
138 openssl-x509(1).
139 The third step is to check the trust settings on the last certificate
141 (which typically is a self-signed root CA certificate). It must be
142 trusted for the given use. For compatibility with previous versions of
143 OpenSSL, a self-signed certificate with no trust attributes is
144 considered to be valid for all uses.
145 The fourth, and final, step is to check the validity of the certificate
147 chain. For each element in the chain, including the root CA
148 certificate, the validity period as specified by the "notBefore" and
149 "notAfter" fields is checked against the current system time. The
150 -attime flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now." The
151 certificate signature is checked as well (except for the signature of
152 the typically self-signed root CA certificate, which is verified only
153 if the -check_ss_sig option is given). When verifying a certificate
154 signature the keyUsage extension (if present) of the candidate issuer
155 certificate is checked to permit digitalSignature for signing proxy
156 certificates or to permit keyCertSign for signing other certificates,
157 respectively. If all operations complete successfully then certificate
158 is considered valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not
159 valid.
160
162 Trusted Certificate Options
163 The following options specify how to supply the certificates that can
164 be used as trust anchors for certain uses. As mentioned, a collection
165 of such certificates is called a trust store.
166 Note that OpenSSL does not provide a default set of trust anchors.
168 Many Linux distributions include a system default and configure OpenSSL
169 to point to that. Mozilla maintains an influential trust store that
170 can be found at
171 <https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/>.
172 The certificates to add to the trust store can be specified using
174 following options.
175 -CAfile file
177 Load the specified file which contains a certificate or several of
178 them in case the input is in PEM or PKCS#12 format. PEM-encoded
179 certificates may also have trust attributes set.
180 -no-CAfile
182 Do not load the default file of trusted certificates.
183 -CApath dir
185 Use the specified directory as a collection of trusted
186 certificates, i.e., a trust store. Files should be named with the
187 hash value of the X.509 SubjectName of each certificate. This is so
188 that the library can extract the IssuerName, hash it, and directly
189 lookup the file to get the issuer certificate. See
190 openssl-rehash(1) for information on creating this type of
191 directory.
192 -no-CApath
194 Do not use the default directory of trusted certificates.
195 -CAstore uri
197 Use uri as a store of CA certificates. The URI may indicate a
198 single certificate, as well as a collection of them. With URIs in
199 the "file:" scheme, this acts as -CAfile or -CApath, depending on
200 if the URI indicates a single file or directory. See
201 ossl_store-file(7) for more information on the "file:" scheme.
202 These certificates are also used when building the server
204 certificate chain (for example with openssl-s_server(1)) or client
205 certificate chain (for example with openssl-s_time(1)).
206 -no-CAstore
208 Do not use the default store of trusted CA certificates.
209 Verification Options
211 The certificate verification can be fine-tuned with the following
212 flags.
213 -verbose
215 Print extra information about the operations being performed.
216 -attime timestamp
218 Perform validation checks using time specified by timestamp and not
219 current system time. timestamp is the number of seconds since
220 January 1, 1970 (i.e., the Unix Epoch).
221 -no_check_time
223 This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates
224 and CRLs against the current time. If option -attime is used to
225 specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
226 -x509_strict
228 This disables non-compliant workarounds for broken certificates.
229 Thus errors are thrown on certificates not compliant with RFC 5280.
230 When this option is set, among others, the following certificate
232 well-formedness conditions are checked:
233 • The basicConstraints of CA certificates must be marked
235 critical.
236 • CA certificates must explicitly include the keyUsage extension.
238 • If a pathlenConstraint is given the key usage keyCertSign must
240 be allowed.
241 • The pathlenConstraint must not be given for non-CA
243 certificates.
244 • The issuer name of any certificate must not be empty.
246 • The subject name of CA certs, certs with keyUsage crlSign, and
248 certs without subjectAlternativeName must not be empty.
249 • If a subjectAlternativeName extension is given it must not be
251 empty.
252 • The signatureAlgorithm field and the cert signature must be
254 consistent.
255 • Any given authorityKeyIdentifier and any given
257 subjectKeyIdentifier must not be marked critical.
258 • The authorityKeyIdentifier must be given for X.509v3 certs
260 unless they are self-signed.
261 • The subjectKeyIdentifier must be given for all X.509v3 CA
263 certs.
264 -ignore_critical
266 Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present that is not
267 supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by
268 RFC5280). If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
269 -issuer_checks
271 Ignored.
272 -crl_check
274 Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a
275 valid CRL. If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
276 -crl_check_all
278 Checks the validity of all certificates in the chain by attempting
279 to look up valid CRLs.
280 -use_deltas
282 Enable support for delta CRLs.
283 -extended_crl
285 Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate
286 CRL signing keys.
287 -suiteB_128_only, -suiteB_128, -suiteB_192
289 Enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128
290 bit or 192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
291 See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature
292 algorithms are reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384
293 and only the elliptic curves P-256 and P-384.
294 -auth_level level
296 Set the certificate chain authentication security level to level.
297 The authentication security level determines the acceptable
298 signature and public key strength when verifying certificate
299 chains. For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of
300 all the certificates must meet the specified security level. The
301 signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the
302 certificates in the chain except for the chain's trust anchor,
303 which is either directly trusted or validated by means other than
304 its signature. See SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3) for the
305 definitions of the available levels. The default security level is
306 -1, or "not set". At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are
307 acceptable. Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent
308 security and is broadly interoperable, though it will, for example,
309 reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits.
310 -partial_chain
312 Allow verification to succeed if an incomplete chain can be built.
313 That is, a chain ending in a certificate that normally would not be
314 trusted (because it has no matching positive trust attributes and
315 is not self-signed) but is an element of the trust store. This
316 certificate may be self-issued or belong to an intermediate CA.
317 -check_ss_sig
319 Verify the signature of the last certificate in a chain if the
320 certificate is supposedly self-signed. This is prohibited and will
321 result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA certificate with
322 key usage restrictions not including the keyCertSign bit. This
323 verification is disabled by default because it doesn't add any
324 security.
325 -allow_proxy_certs
327 Allow the verification of proxy certificates.
328 -trusted_first
330 As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be
331 disabled.
332 When constructing the certificate chain, the trusted certificates
334 specified via -CAfile, -CApath, -CAstore or -trusted are always
335 used before any certificates specified via -untrusted.
336 -no_alt_chains
338 As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, since -trusted_first always on, this option
339 has no effect.
340 -trusted file
342 Parse file as a set of one or more certificates. Each of them
343 qualifies as trusted if has a suitable positive trust attribute or
344 it is self-signed or the -partial_chain option is specified. This
345 option implies the -no-CAfile, -no-CApath, and -no-CAstore options
346 and it cannot be used with the -CAfile, -CApath or -CAstore
347 options, so only certificates specified using the -trusted option
348 are trust anchors. This option may be used multiple times.
349 -untrusted file
351 Parse file as a set of one or more certificates. All certificates
352 (typically of intermediate CAs) are considered untrusted and may be
353 used to construct a certificate chain from the target certificate
354 to a trust anchor. This option may be used multiple times.
355 -policy arg
357 Enable policy processing and add arg to the user-initial-policy-set
358 (see RFC5280). The policy arg can be an object name an OID in
359 numeric form. This argument can appear more than once.
360 -explicit_policy
362 Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
363 -policy_check
365 Enables certificate policy processing.
366 -policy_print
368 Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
369 -inhibit_any
371 Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
372 -inhibit_map
374 Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
375 -purpose purpose
377 The intended use for the certificate. Currently defined purposes
378 are "sslclient", "sslserver", "nssslserver", "smimesign",
379 "smimeencrypt", "crlsign", "ocsphelper", "timestampsign", and
380 "any". If peer certificate verification is enabled, by default the
381 TLS implementation as well as the commands s_client and s_server
382 check for consistency with TLS server or TLS client use,
383 respectively.
384 While IETF RFC 5280 says that id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth
386 are only for WWW use, in practice they are used for all kinds of
387 TLS clients and servers, and this is what OpenSSL assumes as well.
388 -verify_depth num
390 Limit the certificate chain to num intermediate CA certificates. A
391 maximal depth chain can have up to num+2 certificates, since
392 neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate
393 count against the -verify_depth limit.
394 -verify_email email
396 Verify if email matches the email address in Subject Alternative
397 Name or the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
398 -verify_hostname hostname
400 Verify if hostname matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
401 Common Name in the subject certificate.
402 -verify_ip ip
404 Verify if ip matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
405 the subject certificate.
406 -verify_name name
408 Use default verification policies like trust model and required
409 certificate policies identified by name. The trust model
410 determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable to
411 verifying the given certificate chain. They can be given using the
412 -addtrust and -addreject options for openssl-x509(1). Supported
413 policy names include: default, pkcs7, smime_sign, ssl_client,
414 ssl_server. These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust
415 settings used in SSL, CMS and S/MIME. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the
416 trust model is inferred from the purpose when not specified, so the
417 -verify_name options are functionally equivalent to the
418 corresponding -purpose settings.
419 Extended Verification Options
421 Sometimes there may be more than one certificate chain leading to an
422 end-entity certificate. This usually happens when a root or
423 intermediate CA signs a certificate for another a CA in other
424 organization. Another reason is when a CA might have intermediates
425 that use two different signature formats, such as a SHA-1 and a SHA-256
426 digest.
427 The following options can be used to provide data that will allow the
429 OpenSSL command to generate an alternative chain.
430 -xkey infile, -xcert infile, -xchain
432 Specify an extra certificate, private key and certificate chain.
433 These behave in the same manner as the -cert, -key and -cert_chain
434 options. When specified, the callback returning the first valid
435 chain will be in use by the client.
436 -xchain_build
438 Specify whether the application should build the certificate chain
439 to be provided to the server for the extra certificates via the
440 -xkey, -xcert, and -xchain options.
441 -xcertform DER|PEM|P12
443 The input format for the extra certificate. This option has no
444 effect and is retained for backward compatibility only.
445 -xkeyform DER|PEM|P12
447 The input format for the extra key. This option has no effect and
448 is retained for backward compatibility only.
449 Certificate Extensions
451 Options like -purpose lead to checking the certificate extensions,
452 which determine what the target certificate and intermediate CA
453 certificates can be used for.
454 Basic Constraints
456 The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the
458 certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a
459 CA, if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. All CAs should have
460 the CA flag set to true.
461 If the basicConstraints extension is absent, which includes the case
463 that it is an X.509v1 certificate, then the certificate is considered
464 to be a "possible CA" and other extensions are checked according to the
465 intended use of the certificate. The treatment of certificates without
466 basicConstraints as a CA is presently supported, but this could change
467 in the future.
468 Key Usage
470 If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are
472 made on the uses of the certificate. A CA certificate must have the
473 keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.
474 Extended Key Usage
476 The extKeyUsage (EKU) extension places additional restrictions on the
478 certificate uses. If this extension is present (whether critical or
479 not) the key can only be used for the purposes specified.
480 A complete description of each check is given below. The comments about
482 basicConstraints and keyUsage and X.509v1 certificates above apply to
483 all CA certificates.
484 SSL Client
486 The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web
487 client authentication" OID. The keyUsage extension must be absent
488 or it must have the digitalSignature bit set. The Netscape
489 certificate type must be absent or it must have the SSL client bit
490 set.
491 SSL Client CA
493 The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web
494 client authentication" OID. The Netscape certificate type must be
495 absent or it must have the SSL CA bit set. This is used as a work
496 around if the basicConstraints extension is absent.
497 SSL Server
499 The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web
500 server authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. The keyUsage
501 extension must be absent or it must have the digitalSignature, the
502 keyEncipherment set or both bits set. The Netscape certificate
503 type must be absent or have the SSL server bit set.
504 SSL Server CA
506 The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web
507 server authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. The Netscape
508 certificate type must be absent or the SSL CA bit must be set.
509 This is used as a work around if the basicConstraints extension is
510 absent.
511 Netscape SSL Server
513 For Netscape SSL clients to connect to an SSL server it must have
514 the keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.
515 This isn't always valid because some cipher suites use the key for
516 digital signing. Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server.
517 Common S/MIME Client Tests
519 The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the
520 "email protection" OID. The Netscape certificate type must be
521 absent or should have the S/MIME bit set. If the S/MIME bit is not
522 set in the Netscape certificate type then the SSL client bit is
523 tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown. This is
524 because some Verisign certificates don't set the S/MIME bit.
525 S/MIME Signing
527 In addition to the common S/MIME client tests the digitalSignature
528 bit or the nonRepudiation bit must be set if the keyUsage extension
529 is present.
530 S/MIME Encryption
532 In addition to the common S/MIME tests the keyEncipherment bit must
533 be set if the keyUsage extension is present.
534 S/MIME CA
536 The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the
537 "email protection" OID. The Netscape certificate type must be
538 absent or must have the S/MIME CA bit set. This is used as a work
539 around if the basicConstraints extension is absent.
540 CRL Signing
542 The keyUsage extension must be absent or it must have the CRL
543 signing bit set.
544 CRL Signing CA
546 The normal CA tests apply. Except in this case the basicConstraints
547 extension must be present.
548
550 The issuer checks still suffer from limitations in the underlying
551 X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that trusted certificates
552 with matching subject name must appear in a file (as specified by the
553 -CAfile option), a directory (as specified by -CApath), or a store (as
554 specified by -CAstore). If there are multiple such matches, possibly
555 in multiple locations, only the first one (in the mentioned order of
556 locations) is recognised.
557
559 X509_verify_cert(3), openssl-verify(1), openssl-ocsp(1), openssl-ts(1),
560 openssl-s_client(1), openssl-s_server(1), openssl-smime(1),
561 openssl-cmp(1), openssl-cms(1)
562
564 The checks enabled by -x509_strict have been extended in OpenSSL 3.0.
565
567 Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
568 Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
570 this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
571 in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
572 <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
5733.0.5 2022-07-05OPENSSL-VERIFICATION-OPTIONS(1ossl)