1SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)        systemd-cryptenroll       SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)
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3
4

NAME

6       systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices to
7       LUKS2 encrypted volumes
8

SYNOPSIS

10       systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]
11

DESCRIPTION

13       systemd-cryptenroll is a tool for enrolling hardware security tokens
14       and devices into a LUKS2 encrypted volume, which may then be used to
15       unlock the volume during boot. Specifically, it supports tokens and
16       credentials of the following kind to be enrolled:
17
18        1. PKCS#11 security tokens and smartcards that may carry an RSA key
19           pair (e.g. various YubiKeys)
20
21        2. FIDO2 security tokens that implement the "hmac-secret" extension
22           (most FIDO2 keys, including YubiKeys)
23
24        3. TPM2 security devices
25
26        4. Regular passphrases
27
28        5. Recovery keys. These are similar to regular passphrases, however
29           are randomly generated on the computer and thus generally have
30           higher entropy than user-chosen passphrases. Their character set
31           has been designed to ensure they are easy to type in, while having
32           high entropy. They may also be scanned off screen using QR codes.
33           Recovery keys may be used for unlocking LUKS2 volumes wherever
34           passphrases are accepted. They are intended to be used in
35           combination with an enrolled hardware security token, as a recovery
36           option when the token is lost.
37
38       In addition, the tool may be used to enumerate currently enrolled
39       security tokens and wipe a subset of them. The latter may be combined
40       with the enrollment operation of a new security token, in order to
41       update or replace enrollments.
42
43       The tool supports only LUKS2 volumes, as it stores token
44       meta-information in the LUKS2 JSON token area, which is not available
45       in other encryption formats.
46

LIMITATIONS

48       Note that currently when enrolling a new key of one of the five
49       supported types listed above, it is required to first provide a
50       passphrase, a recovery key or a FIDO2 token. It's currently not
51       supported to unlock a device with a TPM2/PKCS#11 key in order to enroll
52       a new TPM2/PKCS#11 key. Thus, if in future key roll-over is desired
53       it's generally recommended to ensure a passphrase, a recovery key or a
54       FIDO2 token is always enrolled.
55
56       Also note that support for enrolling multiple FIDO2 tokens is currently
57       limited. When multiple FIDO2 tokens are enrolled, systemd-cryptseup
58       will perform pre-flight requests to attempt to identify which of the
59       enrolled tokens are currently plugged in. However, this is not possible
60       for FIDO2 tokens with user verification (UV, usually via biometrics),
61       in which case it will fall back to attempting each enrolled token one
62       by one. This will result in multiple prompts for PIN and user
63       verification. This limitation does not apply to PKCS#11 tokens.
64

COMPATIBILITY

66       Security technology both in systemd and in the general industry
67       constantly evolves. In order to provide best security guarantees, the
68       way TPM2, FIDO2, PKCS#11 devices are enrolled is regularly updated in
69       newer versions of systemd. Whenever this happens the following
70       compatibility guarantees are given:
71
72       •   Old enrollments continue to be supported and may be unlocked with
73           newer versions of systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8).
74
75       •   The opposite is not guaranteed however: it might not be possible to
76           unlock volumes with enrollments done with a newer version of
77           systemd-cryptenroll with an older version of systemd-cryptsetup.
78
79       That said, it is generally recommended to use matching versions of
80       systemd-cryptenroll and systemd-cryptsetup, since this is best tested
81       and supported.
82
83       It might be advisable to re-enroll existing enrollments to take benefit
84       of newer security features, as they are added to systemd.
85

OPTIONS

87       The following options are understood:
88
89       --password
90           Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly
91           equivalent to cryptsetup luksAddKey, however may be combined with
92           --wipe-slot= in one call, see below.
93
94       --recovery-key
95           Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are mostly identical to
96           passphrases, but are computer-generated instead of being chosen by
97           a human, and thus have a guaranteed high entropy. The key uses a
98           character set that is easy to type in, and may be scanned off
99           screen via a QR code.
100
101       --unlock-key-file=PATH
102           Use a file instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin to
103           unlock the volume. Expects the PATH to the file containing your key
104           to unlock the volume. Currently there is nothing like
105           --key-file-offset= or --key-file-size= so this file has to only
106           contain the full key.
107
108       --unlock-fido2-device=PATH
109           Use a FIDO2 device instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin
110           to unlock the volume. Expects a hidraw device referring to the
111           FIDO2 device (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the special value
112           "auto" may be specified, in order to automatically determine the
113           device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which
114           there must be exactly one). This automatic discovery is unsupported
115           if --fido2-device= option is also specified.
116
117       --pkcs11-token-uri=URI
118           Enroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a YubiKey).
119           Expects a PKCS#11 smartcard URI referring to the token.
120           Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in order
121           to automatically determine the URI of a currently plugged in
122           security token (of which there must be exactly one). The special
123           value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable PKCS#11 tokens
124           currently plugged in. The security token must contain an RSA key
125           pair which is used to encrypt the randomly generated key that is
126           used to unlock the LUKS2 volume. The encrypted key is then stored
127           in the LUKS2 JSON token header area.
128
129           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11 security
130           token, specify the pkcs11-uri= option in the respective
131           /etc/crypttab line:
132
133               myvolume /dev/sda1 - pkcs11-uri=auto
134
135           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
136           systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line.
137
138       --fido2-credential-algorithm=STRING
139           Specify COSE algorithm used in credential generation. The default
140           value is "es256". Supported values are "es256", "rs256" and
141           "eddsa".
142
143           "es256" denotes ECDSA over NIST P-256 with SHA-256.  "rs256"
144           denotes 2048-bit RSA with PKCS#1.5 padding and SHA-256.  "eddsa"
145           denotes EDDSA over Curve25519 with SHA-512.
146
147           Note that your authenticator may not support some algorithms.
148
149       --fido2-device=PATH
150           Enroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the "hmac-secret"
151           extension (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a hidraw device referring to
152           the FIDO2 device (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the special
153           value "auto" may be specified, in order to automatically determine
154           the device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which
155           there must be exactly one). This automatic discovery is unsupported
156           if --unlock-fido2-device= option is also specified. The special
157           value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable FIDO2 tokens
158           currently plugged in. Note that many hardware security tokens that
159           implement FIDO2 also implement the older PKCS#11 standard.
160           Typically FIDO2 is preferable, given it's simpler to use and more
161           modern.
162
163           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2 security
164           token, specify the fido2-device= option in the respective
165           /etc/crypttab line:
166
167               myvolume /dev/sda1 - fido2-device=auto
168
169           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
170           systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line.
171
172       --fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL
173           When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require
174           the user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2
175           "clientPin" feature). Defaults to "yes". (Note: this setting is
176           without effect if the security token does not support the
177           "clientPin" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling
178           it.)
179
180       --fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL
181           When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require
182           the user to verify presence (tap the token, the FIDO2 "up" feature)
183           when unlocking the volume. Defaults to "yes". (Note: this setting
184           is without effect if the security token does not support the "up"
185           feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.)
186
187       --fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL
188           When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require
189           user verification when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2 "uv"
190           feature). Defaults to "no". (Note: this setting is without effect
191           if the security token does not support the "uv" feature at all, or
192           does not allow enabling or disabling it.)
193
194       --tpm2-device=PATH
195           Enroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path referring
196           to the TPM2 chip (e.g.  /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively the special
197           value "auto" may be specified, in order to automatically determine
198           the device node of a currently discovered TPM2 device (of which
199           there must be exactly one). The special value "list" may be used to
200           enumerate all suitable TPM2 devices currently discovered.
201
202           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2 security
203           chip, specify the tpm2-device= option in the respective
204           /etc/crypttab line:
205
206               myvolume /dev/sda1 - tpm2-device=auto
207
208           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a
209           systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line.
210
211           Use --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR indexes to
212           bind the enrollment to.
213
214       --tpm2-pcrs= [PCR...]
215           Configures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) to bind
216           the enrollment requested via --tpm2-device= to. Takes a "+"
217           separated list of numeric PCR indexes in the range 0...23. If not
218           used, defaults to PCR 7 only. If an empty string is specified,
219           binds the enrollment to no PCRs at all. PCRs allow binding the
220           enrollment to specific software versions and system state, so that
221           the enrolled unlocking key is only accessible (may be "unsealed")
222           if specific trusted software and/or configuration is used.
223
224           Table 1. Well-known PCR Definitions
225           ┌────┬────────────────────────────┐
226PCR Explanation                
227           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
228           │0   │ Core system firmware       │
229           │    │ executable code; changes   │
230           │    │ on firmware updates        │
231           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
232           │1   │ Core system firmware       │
233           │    │ data/host platform         │
234           │    │ configuration; typically   │
235           │    │ contains serial and model  │
236           │    │ numbers, changes on basic  │
237           │    │ hardware/CPU/RAM           │
238           │    │ replacements               │
239           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
240           │2   │ Extended or pluggable      │
241           │    │ executable code; includes  │
242           │    │ option ROMs on pluggable   │
243           │    │ hardware                   │
244           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
245           │3   │ Extended or pluggable      │
246           │    │ firmware data; includes    │
247           │    │ information about          │
248           │    │ pluggable hardware         │
249           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
250           │4   │ Boot loader and additional │
251           │    │ drivers; changes on boot   │
252           │    │ loader updates. The shim   │
253           │    │ project will measure the   │
254           │    │ PE binary it chain loads   │
255           │    │ into this PCR. If the      │
256           │    │ Linux kernel is invoked as │
257           │    │ UEFI PE binary, it is      │
258           │    │ measured here, too. sd-    
259           │    │ stub(7) measures system    │
260           │    │ extension images read from │
261           │    │ the ESP here too (see      │
262           │    │ systemd-sysext(8)).        │
263           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
264           │5   │ GPT/Partition table;       │
265           │    │ changes when the           │
266           │    │ partitions are added,      │
267           │    │ modified or removed        │
268           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
269           │6   │ Power state events;        │
270           │    │ changes on system          │
271           │    │ suspend/sleep              │
272           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
273           │7   │ Secure Boot state; changes │
274           │    │ when UEFI SecureBoot mode  │
275           │    │ is enabled/disabled, or    │
276           │    │ firmware certificates (PK, │
277           │    │ KEK, db, dbx, ...)         │
278           │    │ changes. The shim project  │
279           │    │ will measure most of its   │
280           │    │ (non-MOK) certificates and │
281           │    │ SBAT data into this PCR.   │
282           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
283           │9   │ The Linux kernel measures  │
284           │    │ all initrds it receives    │
285           │    │ into this PCR.             │
286           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
287           │10  │ The IMA project measures   │
288           │    │ its runtime state into     │
289           │    │ this PCR.                  │
290           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
291           │11  │ systemd-stub(7) measures   │
292           │    │ the ELF kernel image,      │
293           │    │ embedded initrd and other  │
294           │    │ payload of the PE image it │
295           │    │ is placed in into this     │
296           │    │ PCR. Unlike PCR 4 (where   │
297           │    │ the same data should be    │
298           │    │ measured into), this PCR   │
299           │    │ value should be easy to    │
300           │    │ pre-calculate, as this     │
301           │    │ only contains static parts │
302           │    │ of the PE binary. Use this │
303           │    │ PCR to bind TPM policies   │
304           │    │ to a specific kernel       │
305           │    │ image, possibly with an    │
306           │    │ embedded initrd. systemd-  
307           │    │ pcrphase.service(8)        │
308           │    │ measures boot phase        │
309           │    │ strings into this PCR at   │
310           │    │ various milestones of the  │
311           │    │ boot process.              │
312           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
313           │12  │ systemd-boot(7) measures   │
314           │    │ the kernel command line    │
315           │    │ into this PCR. systemd-    
316           │    │ stub(7) measures any       │
317           │    │ manually specified kernel  │
318           │    │ command line (i.e. a       │
319           │    │ kernel command line that   │
320           │    │ overrides the one embedded │
321           │    │ in the unified PE image)   │
322           │    │ and loaded credentials     │
323           │    │ into this PCR. (Note that  │
324           │    │ if systemd-boot and        │
325           │    │ systemd-stub are used in   │
326           │    │ combination the command    │
327           │    │ line might be measured     │
328           │    │ twice!)                    │
329           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
330           │13  │ systemd-stub(7) measures   │
331           │    │ any systemd-sysext(8)
332           │    │ images it loads and passed │
333           │    │ to the booted kernel into  │
334           │    │ this PCR.                  │
335           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
336           │14  │ The shim project measures  │
337           │    │ its "MOK" certificates and │
338           │    │ hashes into this PCR.      │
339           ├────┼────────────────────────────┤
340           │15  │ systemd-cryptsetup(7)      │
341           │    │ optionally measures the    │
342           │    │ volume key of activated    │
343           │    │ LUKS volumes into this     │
344           │    │ PCR.                       │
345           └────┴────────────────────────────┘
346           For most applications it should be sufficient to bind against PCR 7
347           (and possibly PCR 14, if shim/MOK is desired), as this includes
348           measurements of the trusted certificates (and possibly hashes) that
349           are used to validate all components of the boot process up to and
350           including the OS kernel. In order to simplify firmware and OS
351           version updates it's typically not advisable to include PCRs such
352           as 0 and 2 in the binding of the enrollment, since the program code
353           they cover should already be protected indirectly through the
354           certificates measured into PCR 7. Validation through these
355           certificates is typically preferable over validation through direct
356           measurements as it is less brittle in context of OS/firmware
357           updates: the measurements will change on every update, but code
358           signatures likely will validate against pre-existing certificates.
359
360       --tpm2-with-pin=BOOL
361           When enrolling a TPM2 device, controls whether to require the user
362           to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume in addition to PCR
363           binding, based on TPM2 policy authentication. Defaults to "no".
364           Despite being called PIN, any character can be used, not just
365           numbers.
366
367           Note that incorrect PIN entry when unlocking increments the TPM
368           dictionary attack lockout mechanism, and may lock out users for a
369           prolonged time, depending on its configuration. The lockout
370           mechanism is a global property of the TPM, systemd-cryptenroll does
371           not control or configure the lockout mechanism. You may use
372           tpm2-tss tools to inspect or configure the dictionary attack
373           lockout, with tpm2_getcap(1) and tpm2_dictionarylockout(1)
374           commands, respectively.
375
376       --tpm2-public-key= [PATH], --tpm2-public-key-pcrs= [PCR...],
377       --tpm2-signature= [PATH]
378           Configures a TPM2 signed PCR policy to bind encryption to. The
379           --tpm2-public-key= option accepts a path to a PEM encoded RSA
380           public key, to bind the encryption to. If this is not specified
381           explicitly, but a file tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem exists in one of the
382           directories /etc/systemd/, /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/
383           (searched in this order), it is automatically used. The
384           --tpm2-public-key-pcrs= option takes a list of TPM2 PCR indexes to
385           bind to (same syntax as --tpm2-pcrs= described above). If not
386           specified defaults to 11 (i.e. this binds the policy to any unified
387           kernel image for which a PCR signature can be provided).
388
389           Note the difference between --tpm2-pcrs= and
390           --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=: the former binds decryption to the
391           current, specific PCR values; the latter binds decryption to any
392           set of PCR values for which a signature by the specified public key
393           can be provided. The latter is hence more useful in scenarios where
394           software updates shell be possible without losing access to all
395           previously encrypted LUKS2 volumes.
396
397           The --tpm2-signature= option takes a path to a TPM2 PCR signature
398           file as generated by the systemd-measure(1) tool. If this is not
399           specified explicitly a suitable signature file
400           tpm2-pcr-signature.json is searched for in /etc/systemd/,
401           /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/ (in this order) and used. If a
402           signature file is specified or found it is used to verify if the
403           volume can be unlocked with it given the current PCR state, before
404           the new slot is written to disk. This is intended as safety net to
405           ensure that access to a volume is not lost if a public key is
406           enrolled for which no valid signature for the current PCR state is
407           available. If the supplied signature does not unlock the current
408           PCR state and public key combination, no slot is enrolled and the
409           operation will fail. If no signature file is specified or found no
410           such safety verification is done.
411
412       --wipe-slot= [SLOT...]
413           Wipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated list of
414           numeric slot indexes, or the special strings "all" (for wiping all
415           key slots), "empty" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by
416           an empty passphrase), "password" (for wiping all key slots that are
417           unlocked by a traditional passphrase), "recovery" (for wiping all
418           key slots that are unlocked by a recovery key), "pkcs11" (for
419           wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a PKCS#11 token), "fido2"
420           (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a FIDO2 token),
421           "tpm2" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a TPM2 chip),
422           or any combination of these strings or numeric indexes, in which
423           case all slots matching either are wiped. As safety precaution an
424           operation that wipes all slots without exception (so that the
425           volume cannot be unlocked at all anymore, unless the volume key is
426           known) is refused.
427
428           This switch may be used alone, in which case only the requested
429           wipe operation is executed. It may also be used in combination with
430           any of the enrollment options listed above, in which case the
431           enrollment is completed first, and only when successful the wipe
432           operation executed — and the newly added slot is always excluded
433           from the wiping. Combining enrollment and slot wiping may thus be
434           used to update existing enrollments:
435
436               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto
437
438           The above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe all
439           previously created TPM2 enrollments on the LUKS2 volume, leaving
440           only the newly created one. Combining wiping and enrollment may
441           also be used to replace enrollments of different types, for example
442           for changing from a PKCS#11 enrollment to a FIDO2 one:
443
444               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto
445
446           Or for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2:
447
448               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto
449
450       -h, --help
451           Print a short help text and exit.
452
453       --version
454           Print a short version string and exit.
455

EXIT STATUS

457       On success, 0 is returned, a non-zero failure code otherwise.
458

EXAMPLES

460       crypttab(5) and systemd-measure(1) contain various examples employing
461       systemd-cryptenroll.
462

SEE ALSO

464       systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8), crypttab(5), cryptsetup(8),
465       systemd-measure(1)
466
467
468
469systemd 253                                             SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)
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