1sandbox_net_selinux(8) SELinux Policy sandbox_net sandbox_net_selinux(8)
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6 sandbox_net_selinux - Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sand‐
7 box_net processes
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10 Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sandbox_net processes via flexible
11 mandatory access control.
12 The sandbox_net processes execute with the sandbox_net_t SELinux type.
14 You can check if you have these processes running by executing the ps
15 command with the -Z qualifier.
16 For example:
18 ps -eZ | grep sandbox_net_t
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24 SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the
25 system
26 You can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps
28 Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. SELinux
30 sandbox_net policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sand‐
31 box_net processes in as secure a method as possible.
32 The following process types are defined for sandbox_net:
34 sandbox_net_t, sandbox_net_client_t
36 Note: semanage permissive -a sandbox_net_t can be used to make the
38 process type sandbox_net_t permissive. SELinux does not deny access to
39 permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are
40 still generated.
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44 The SELinux process type sandbox_net_t is an MCS (Multi Category Secu‐
45 rity) constrained type. Sometimes this separation is referred to as
46 sVirt. These types are usually used for securing multi-tenant environ‐
47 ments, such as virtualization, containers or separation of users. The
48 tools used to launch MCS types, pick out a different MCS label for each
49 process group.
50 For example one process might be launched with sandbox_net_t:s0:c1,c2,
52 and another process launched with sandbox_net_t:s0:c3,c4. The SELinux
53 kernel only allows these processes can only write to content with a
54 matching MCS label, or a MCS Label of s0. A process running with the
55 MCS level of s0:c1,c2 is not allowed to write to content with the MCS
56 label of s0:c3,c4
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60 SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sand‐
61 box_net policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that
62 allow you to manipulate the policy and run sandbox_net with the tight‐
63 est access possible.
64 If you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as
68 both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable
69 should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the deny_execmem bool‐
70 ean. Enabled by default.
71 setsebool -P deny_execmem 1
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77 The SELinux process type sandbox_net_t can manage files labeled with
78 the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for
79 these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC per‐
80 missions.
81 fusefs_t
83 /var/run/user/[^/]*/gvfs
85 mozilla_plugin_rw_t
87 /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins-wrapped(/.*)?
89 sandbox_file_t
91 sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t
94 security_t
97 /selinux
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102 semanage fcontext can also be used to manipulate default file context
103 mappings.
104 semanage permissive can also be used to manipulate whether or not a
106 process type is permissive.
107 semanage module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove pol‐
109 icy modules.
110 semanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans
112 system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux pol‐
115 icy settings.
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119 This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage .
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123 selinux(8), sandbox_net(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1),
124 sepolicy(8), setsebool(8), sandbox_net_client_selinux(8), sand‐
125 box_net_client_selinux(8)
126sandbox_net 20-05-05 sandbox_net_selinux(8)