1CHROOT(2) Linux Programmer's Manual CHROOT(2)
2
6 chroot - change root directory
7
9 #include <unistd.h>
10 int chroot(const char *path);
12 Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):
14 chroot():
16 Since glibc 2.2.2:
17 _XOPEN_SOURCE && ! (_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
18 || /* Since glibc 2.20: */ _DEFAULT_SOURCE
19 || /* Glibc versions <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE
20 Before glibc 2.2.2: none
21
23 chroot() changes the root directory of the calling process to that
24 specified in path. This directory will be used for pathnames beginning
25 with /. The root directory is inherited by all children of the calling
26 process.
27 Only a privileged process (Linux: one with the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capabil‐
29 ity in its user namespace) may call chroot().
30 This call changes an ingredient in the pathname resolution process and
32 does nothing else. In particular, it is not intended to be used for
33 any kind of security purpose, neither to fully sandbox a process nor to
34 restrict filesystem system calls. In the past, chroot() has been used
35 by daemons to restrict themselves prior to passing paths supplied by
36 untrusted users to system calls such as open(2). However, if a folder
37 is moved out of the chroot directory, an attacker can exploit that to
38 get out of the chroot directory as well. The easiest way to do that is
39 to chdir(2) to the to-be-moved directory, wait for it to be moved out,
40 then open a path like ../../../etc/passwd.
41 A slightly trickier variation also works under some circumstances if
43 chdir(2) is not permitted. If a daemon allows a "chroot directory" to
44 be specified, that usually means that if you want to prevent remote
45 users from accessing files outside the chroot directory, you must
46 ensure that folders are never moved out of it.
47 This call does not change the current working directory, so that after
49 the call '.' can be outside the tree rooted at '/'. In particular, the
50 superuser can escape from a "chroot jail" by doing:
51 mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..
53 This call does not close open file descriptors, and such file descrip‐
55 tors may allow access to files outside the chroot tree.
56
58 On success, zero is returned. On error, -1 is returned, and errno is
59 set appropriately.
60
62 Depending on the filesystem, other errors can be returned. The more
63 general errors are listed below:
64 EACCES Search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix.
66 (See also path_resolution(7).)
67 EFAULT path points outside your accessible address space.
69 EIO An I/O error occurred.
71 ELOOP Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving path.
73 ENAMETOOLONG
75 path is too long.
76 ENOENT The file does not exist.
78 ENOMEM Insufficient kernel memory was available.
80 ENOTDIR
82 A component of path is not a directory.
83 EPERM The caller has insufficient privilege.
85
87 SVr4, 4.4BSD, SUSv2 (marked LEGACY). This function is not part of
88 POSIX.1-2001.
89
91 A child process created via fork(2) inherits its parent's root direc‐
92 tory. The root directory is left unchanged by execve(2).
93 The magic symbolic link, /proc/[pid]/root, can be used to discover a
95 process's root directory; see proc(5) for details.
96 FreeBSD has a stronger jail() system call.
98
100 chroot(1), chdir(2), pivot_root(2), path_resolution(7), switch_root(8)
101
103 This page is part of release 5.07 of the Linux man-pages project. A
104 description of the project, information about reporting bugs, and the
105 latest version of this page, can be found at
106 https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.
107Linux 2019-03-06 CHROOT(2)