1SCRUB(1) SCRUB SCRUB(1)
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6 scrub - write patterns on disk/file
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9 scrub [-f] [-p nnsa|dod|bsi] [-X] [-D newname] [-s size] file
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12 Scrub iteratively writes patterns on files or disk devices to make
13 retrieving the data more difficult. Scrub operates in one of three
14 modes:
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16 1) The special file corresponding to an entire disk is scrubbed and all
17 data on it is destroyed. This mode is selected if file is a character
18 or block special file. This is the most effective method.
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20 2) A regular file is scrubbed and only the data in the file (and
21 optionally its name in the directory entry) is destroyed. The file
22 size is rounded up to fill out the last file system block. This mode
23 is selected if file is a regular file. See CAVEATS below.
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25 3) file is created, expanded until the file system is full, then
26 scrubbed as in 2). This mode is selected with the -X option. See
27 CAVEATS below.
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29 Scrub accepts the following options:
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31 -p nnsa|dod|bsi|old|fastold
32 Select the patterns to write. nnsa selects patterns compliant
33 with NNSA Policy Letter NAP-14.x; dod selects patterns compliant
34 with DoD 5220.22-M; bsi selects patterns recommended by the Ger‐
35 man Center of Security in Information Technologies
36 (http://www.bsi.bund.de); old selects pre-version 1.7 scrub pat‐
37 terns; and fastold is old without the random pass. See STAN‐
38 DARDS below for more detail. Default: nnsa.
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40 -b blocksize
41 Perform read(2) and write(2) calls using the specified blocksize
42 (in bytes). K, M, or G may be appended to the number to change
43 the units to KiBytes, MiBytes, or GiBytes, respectively.
44 Default: 1M.
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46 -f Scrub even if target contains signature indicating it has
47 already been scrubbed.
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49 -S Do not write scrub signature. Scrub will not be able to ascer‐
50 tain if the disk has already been scrubbed.
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52 -X Create specified regular file and keep appending to it until
53 write returns ENOSPC (file system full), then scrub it as usual.
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55 -D newname
56 After scrubbing the file, scrub its name in the directory entry,
57 then rename it to the new name. The scrub patterns used on the
58 directory entry are constrained by the operating system and thus
59 are not compliant with cited standards.
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61 -s size
62 Override the device size (in bytes). Without this option, scrub
63 determines media capacity using OS-specific ioctl(2) calls. K,
64 M, or G may be appended to the number to change the units to
65 KiBytes, MiBytes, or GiBytes, respectively.
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69 Scrub may be insufficient to thwart heroic efforts to recover data in
70 an appropriately equipped lab.
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72 Scrub nnsa patterns are reasonable for sanitizing modern PRML/EPRML
73 encoded disk devices. For older MFM/RLL encoded drives, the shred(1)
74 program from GNU coreutils does a more thorough and scientific (but
75 more I/O intensive) job of secure deletion, as described in Guttman
76 below.
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78 Scrub makes no attempt to disable write caching on the disk device or
79 deal with spare blocks. RAID and other more sophisticated storage
80 devices may require special handling.
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82 The effectiveness of scrubbing regular files through a file system will
83 be limited by the OS and file system. File systems that are known to
84 be problematic are journaled, log structured, copy-on-write, versioned,
85 and network file systems. If in doubt, scrub the raw disk device.
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87 Scrubbing free blocks in a file system with the -X method is subject to
88 the same caveats as scrubbing regular files, and in addition, is only
89 useful to the extent the file system allows you to reallocate the tar‐
90 get blocks as data blocks in a new file. If in doubt, scrub the raw
91 disk device.
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93 [MacOS X HFS file system] Scrub attempts to overwrite a file's resource
94 fork if it exists. Although MacOS X will support additional named
95 forks in the future, scrub is only aware of the traditional data and
96 resource forks.
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99 The dod scrub sequence is compliant with the DoD 5220.22-M procedure
100 for sanitizing removeable and non-removeable rigid disks which requires
101 overwriting all addressable locations with a character, its complement,
102 then a random character, and verify. Please refer to the DoD document
103 for additional constraints.
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105 The nnsa (default) scrub sequence is compliant with a Dec. 2005 draft
106 of NNSA Policy Letter NAP-14.x (see reference below) for sanitizing
107 removable and non-removable hard disks, which requires overwriting all
108 locations with a pseudorandom pattern twice and then with a known pat‐
109 tern. Please refer to the NNSA document for additional constraints.
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111 Please consult local authorities regarding your site policy for disk
112 sanitization.
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115 Jim Garlick <garlick@llnl.gov>
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117 This work was produced at the University of California, Lawrence Liver‐
118 more National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-ENG-48 with the DOE.
119 Designated UCRL-CODE-2003-006, scrub is licensed under terms of the GNU
120 General Public License.
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123 DoD 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual",
124 Chapter 8, 01/1995.
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126 NNSA Policy Letter: NAP-14.x, "Clearing, Sanitizing, and Destroying
127 Information System Storage Media, Memory Devices, and other Related
128 Hardware", Unpublished Draft, 2005
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130 "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory", by
131 Peter Gutmann, Sixth USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose, CA, July
132 22-25, 1996.
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134 Darik's boot and Nuke FAQ: http://dban.sourceforge.net/faq/index.html
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136 shred(1)
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140LLNL Release 1.7 SCRUB(1)