1scrub(1) scrub scrub(1)
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6 scrub - write patterns on disk/file
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9 scrub [OPTIONS] special-file
10 scrub [OPTIONS] file
11 scrub -X [OPTIONS] directory
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14 Scrub iteratively writes patterns on files or disk devices to make
15 retrieving the data more difficult. Scrub operates in one of three
16 modes:
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18 1) The special file corresponding to an entire disk is scrubbed and all
19 data on it is destroyed. This mode is selected if file is a character
20 or block special file. This is the most effective method.
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22 2) A regular file is scrubbed and only the data in the file (and
23 optionally its name in the directory entry) is destroyed. The file
24 size is rounded up to fill out the last file system block. This mode
25 is selected if file is a regular file. See CAVEATS below.
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27 3) directory is created and filled with files until the file system is
28 full, then the files are scrubbed as in 2). This mode is selected with
29 the -X option. See CAVEATS below.
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32 Scrub accepts the following options:
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34 -v, --version
35 Print scrub version and exit.
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37 -r, --remove
38 Remove the file after scrubbing.
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40 -p, --pattern PATTERN
41 Select the patterns to write. See SCRUB METHODS below. The
42 default, nnsa, is reasonable for sanitizing modern PRML/EPRML
43 encoded disk devices.
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45 -b, --blocksize blocksize
46 Perform read(2) and write(2) calls using the specified blocksize
47 (in bytes). K, M, or G may be appended to the number to change
48 the units to KiBytes, MiBytes, or GiBytes, respectively.
49 Default: 4M.
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51 -f, --force
52 Scrub even if target contains signature indicating it has
53 already been scrubbed.
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55 -S, --no-signature
56 Do not write scrub signature. Later, scrub will not be able to
57 ascertain if the disk has already been scrubbed.
58
59 -X, --freespace
60 Create specified directory and fill it with files until write
61 returns ENOSPC (file system full), then scrub the files as
62 usual. The size of each file can be set with -s, otherwise it
63 will be the maximum file size creatable given the user's file
64 size limit or 1g if unlimited.
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66 -D, --dirent newname
67 After scrubbing the file, scrub its name in the directory entry,
68 then rename it to the new name. The scrub patterns used on the
69 directory entry are constrained by the operating system and thus
70 are not compliant with cited standards.
71
72 -s, --device-size size
73 Override the device size (in bytes). Without this option, scrub
74 determines media capacity using OS-specific ioctl(2) calls. K,
75 M, or G may be appended to the number to change the units to
76 KiBytes, MiBytes, or GiBytes, respectively.
77
78 -L, --no-link
79 If file is a symbolic link, do not scrub the link target. Do
80 remove it, however, if --remove is specified.
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82 -R, --no-hwrand
83 Don't use a hardware random number generator even if one is
84 available.
85
86 -t, --no-threads
87 Don't generate random data in parallel with I/O.
88
89 -h, --help
90 Print a summary of command line options on stderr.
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92 -E, --extent-only
93 When scrubbing regular files, scrub only the file extents. This
94 option is useful in combination with large sparse files. If
95 used, scrub will skip the holes in the sparse file. Use this
96 option with caution, the result may not be compliant with cited
97 standards and information about the actual on-disk data alloca‐
98 tion may leak since only the allocated parts will be scrubbed.
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101 nnsa 4-pass NNSA Policy Letter NAP-14.1-C (XVI-8) for sanitizing
102 removable and non-removable hard disks, which requires overwrit‐
103 ing all locations with a pseudorandom pattern twice and then
104 with a known pattern: random(x2), 0x00, verify.
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106 dod 4-pass DoD 5220.22-M section 8-306 procedure (d) for sanitizing
107 removable and non-removable rigid disks which requires overwrit‐
108 ing all addressable locations with a character, its complement,
109 a random character, then verify. NOTE: scrub performs the ran‐
110 dom pass first to make verification easier: random, 0x00, 0xff,
111 verify.
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113 bsi 9-pass method recommended by the German Center of Security in
114 Information Technologies (http://www.bsi.bund.de): 0xff, 0xfe,
115 0xfd, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xdf, 0xbf, 0x7f.
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117 gutmann
118 The canonical 35-pass sequence described in Gutmann's paper
119 cited below.
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121 schneier
122 7-pass method described by Bruce Schneier in "Applied Cryptogra‐
123 phy" (1996): 0x00, 0xff, random(x5)
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125 pfitzner7
126 Roy Pfitzner's 7-random-pass method: random(x7).
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128 pfitzner33
129 Roy Pfitzner's 33-random-pass method: random(x33).
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131 usarmy US Army AR380-19 method: 0x00, 0xff, random. (Note: identical
132 to DoD 522.22-M section 8-306 procedure (e) for sanitizing mag‐
133 netic core memory).
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135 fillzero
136 1-pass pattern: 0x00.
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138 fillff 1-pass pattern: 0xff.
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140 random 1-pass pattern: random(x1).
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142 random2
143 2-pass pattern: random(x2).
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145 old 6-pass pre-version 1.7 scrub method: 0x00, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x00,
146 0x55, verify.
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148 fastold
149 5-pass pattern: 0x00, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x55, verify.
150
151 custom=string
152 1-pass custom pattern. String may contain C-style numerical
153 escapes: \nnn (octal) or \xnn (hex).
154
156 Scrub may be insufficient to thwart heroic efforts to recover data in
157 an appropriately equipped lab. If you need this level of protection,
158 physical destruction is your best bet.
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160 The effectiveness of scrubbing regular files through a file system will
161 be limited by the OS and file system. File systems that are known to
162 be problematic are journaled, log structured, copy-on-write, versioned,
163 and network file systems. If in doubt, scrub the raw disk device.
164
165 Scrubbing free blocks in a file system with the -X method is subject to
166 the same caveats as scrubbing regular files, and in addition, is only
167 useful to the extent the file system allows you to reallocate the tar‐
168 get blocks as data blocks in a new file. If in doubt, scrub the raw
169 disk device.
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171 On MacOS X HFS file system, scrub attempts to overwrite a file's
172 resource fork if it exists. Although MacOS X claims it will support
173 additional named forks in the future, scrub is only aware of the tradi‐
174 tional data and resource forks.
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176 scrub cannot access disk blocks that have been spared out by the disk
177 controller. For SATA/PATA drives, the ATA "security erase" command
178 built into the drive controller can do this. Similarly, the ATA
179 "enhanced security erase" can erase data on track edges and between
180 tracks. The DOS utility HDDERASE from the UCSD Center for Magnetic
181 Recording Research can issue these commands, as can modern versions of
182 Linux hdparm. Unfortunately, the analogous SCSI command is optional
183 according to T-10, and not widely implemented.
184
186 To scrub a raw device /dev/sdf1 with default NNSA patterns:
187
188 # scrub /dev/sdf1
189 scrub: using NNSA NAP-14.1-C patterns
190 scrub: please verify that device size below is correct!
191 scrub: scrubbing /dev/sdf1 1995650048 bytes (~1GB)
192 scrub: random |................................................|
193 scrub: random |................................................|
194 scrub: 0x00 |................................................|
195 scrub: verify |................................................|
196
197 To scrub the file /tmp/scrubme with a sequence of 0xff 0xaa bytes:
198
199 # scrub -p custom="\xff\xaa" /tmp/scrubme
200 scrub: using Custom single-pass patterns
201 scrub: scrubbing /tmp/scrubme 78319616 bytes (~74MB)
202 scrub: 0xffaa |................................................|
203
205 Jim Garlick <garlick@llnl.gov>
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207 This work was produced at the University of California, Lawrence Liver‐
208 more National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-ENG-48 with the DOE.
209 Designated UCRL-CODE-2003-006, scrub is licensed under terms of the GNU
210 General Public License.
211
213 DoD 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual",
214 Chapter 8, 01/1995.
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216 NNSA Policy Letter: NAP-14.1-C, "Clearing, Sanitizing, and Destroying
217 Information System Storage Media, Memory Devices, and other Related
218 Hardware", 05-02-08, page XVI-8.
219
220 "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory", by
221 Peter Gutmann, Sixth USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose, CA, July
222 22-25, 1996.
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224 "Gutmann Method", Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gut‐
225 mann_method.
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227 Darik's boot and Nuke FAQ: http://dban.sourceforge.net/faq/index.html
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229 "Tutorial on Disk Drive Data Sanitization", by Gordon Hugues and Tom
230 Coughlin,
231 http://cmrr.ucsd.edu/people/Hughes/DataSanitizationTutorial.pdf.
232
233 "Guidelines for Media Sanitization", NIST special publication 800-88,
234 Kissel et al, September, 2006.
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236 shred(1), hdparm(8)
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240scrub-2.5.2 2012-06-20 scrub(1)